import { type PassProblem } from './rules';
/**
 * The conformance check: a finished `.pkpass`, opened and held against the rules.
 *
 * This is what stands in for a phone. It reads the archive back from its bytes
 * — not from whatever the builder thought it wrote — re-derives every hash,
 * verifies the signature cryptographically, and applies {@link RULES} to the
 * `pass.json` that is actually in the file.
 *
 * What it cannot tell anyone is whether a lock screen renders the result as
 * intended, or whether Apple's servers accept the certificate. Those are named
 * in the plan as unprovable here rather than quietly implied by a green check.
 */
export interface VerifyOptions {
    /**
     * Trust anchors the signing certificate must chain to.
     *
     * For a real pass that is Apple's root. Omitted, the signature is still
     * verified — the bytes were signed by the key in the container — but nothing
     * says whose key it is, which is the situation every test with a generated
     * certificate is in, and is why the verdict reports the two separately.
     */
    trustedRoots?: readonly (Buffer | string)[];
}
export interface PassVerdict {
    valid: boolean;
    problems: PassProblem[];
    /** The archive's contents, by name, for a caller that wants to look further. */
    files: string[];
    passJson?: Record<string, unknown>;
    signature: {
        present: boolean;
        verified: boolean;
        /** Whether a chain was actually checked, rather than assumed. */
        chainChecked: boolean;
        signer?: string;
        reason?: string;
    };
}
export declare function verifyPkPass(archive: Uint8Array, options?: VerifyOptions): Promise<PassVerdict>;
//# sourceMappingURL=verify.d.ts.map