/**
 * @module @arcis/node/sanitizers/mass-assignment
 * v1.7 W4. Denylist detection of privilege-escalation fields in a body.
 *
 * The classic mass-assignment attack smuggles a sensitive field into a
 * request body that the handler blindly spreads onto a model:
 *
 *     user.update({ ...req.body })   // attacker set isAdmin: true
 *
 * The allowlist approach (`applyMassAssignFilter` / `MassAssignMiddleware`)
 * is the robust fix but needs a per-route field list, so it cannot be
 * default-on. This detector is the default-on complement: it scans the
 * body for a curated set of privilege/auth field NAMES that a normal
 * client request almost never sets, and blocks when one appears.
 *
 * Scope: detection only. It does not strip or rewrite. Recurses into
 * nested objects and arrays so `{ profile: { permissions: [...] } }` is
 * caught. Value-agnostic: the presence of the key is the signal.
 *
 * False-positive note: `role` and `permissions` DO appear in legitimate
 * admin APIs. Apps with such routes opt out via `arcis({ massAssign: false })`
 * or scope the check off for those paths, then use the allowlist filter
 * (`applyMassAssignFilter`) on the routes that legitimately accept them.
 */
export interface MassAssignDetectOptions {
    /**
     * Sensitive field names to detect (overrides the default set entirely).
     * Compared case-insensitively after stripping `_` and `-`, so
     * `is_admin`, `isAdmin`, and `is-admin` all match a `isadmin` entry.
     */
    sensitiveFields?: string[];
    /** Max recursion depth into nested objects/arrays. Default: 8. */
    maxDepth?: number;
}
export interface MassAssignDetectResult {
    /** True if a sensitive field name was found anywhere in the body. */
    detected: boolean;
    /** The offending field name (original casing) or null. */
    field: string | null;
}
/**
 * Default privilege-escalation field names. Stored in normalized form
 * (lowercased, separators stripped). These are fields a profile/signup
 * update should never carry from the client. `role` / `permissions` are
 * the canonical mass-assignment fields and the FP-risk ones, kept in by
 * default; opt out per-route if your admin API legitimately accepts them.
 */
export declare const SENSITIVE_FIELD_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
/**
 * Recursively scan a parsed JSON body for sensitive field names.
 * Returns the first hit (original-cased key) or `{ detected: false }`.
 */
export declare function detectMassAssignment(body: unknown, options?: MassAssignDetectOptions): MassAssignDetectResult;
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