import { type HandlerContext } from "@aotter/mantle-runtime";
export interface CloudflareTurnstileCheckOptions {
    /** Server-side secret. Pulled from `env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY` by the
     *  factory. The literal string `"dev-stub"` short-circuits to a
     *  local check (`token === "fail"` is rejected, anything else
     *  passes) — useful for integration smokes that run with no
     *  network. Any other value triggers real `siteverify`. */
    readonly secret: string;
    /** Field name on the procedure input carrying the client-side
     *  widget token. Defaults to `"turnstileToken"` (matches the
     *  starter's contact-messages Schema). */
    readonly tokenField?: string;
}
/**
 * `before_create` (or any pre-mutation) hook that verifies a
 * Cloudflare Turnstile token. Builtin handler factory — register
 * with:
 *
 *     register("captchaCheck", cloudflareTurnstileCheck({
 *       secret: env.TURNSTILE_SECRET_KEY ?? "dev-stub",
 *     }));
 *
 * Behavior:
 *
 *   - Authenticated callers (`ctx.user` non-null) bypass — the gate
 *     guards anonymous public-form abuse, not signed-in writes
 *     (admin UI, MCP agents).
 *   - `secret === "dev-stub"`: short-circuit. `token === "fail"`
 *     rejects; anything else passes. Tests assert on this token
 *     shape; integration runs need no network.
 *   - Otherwise: POSTs to `siteverify`, fails on `{ success: false }`
 *     or any HTTP error.
 *
 * Throws `InvokeFailure(AUTH_DENIED)` on rejection so the procedure
 * mount maps it to HTTP 403, the right code for "your form
 * submission was rejected by abuse-prevention." A plain `Error`
 * surfaces as INTERNAL_ERROR (500) and falsely implies a server
 * bug.
 */
export declare function cloudflareTurnstileCheck(options: CloudflareTurnstileCheckOptions): (input: unknown, ctx: HandlerContext) => Promise<{
    ok: true;
}>;
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