import type { BaselineCatalog } from "../baseline-evidence/catalog.js";
import { type BaselineEvidencePipelineDeps } from "../baseline-evidence/pipeline.js";
import { type PlanResult } from "../internals/execute.js";
import { type PlanContext } from "../internals/plan.js";
import type { OrgPolicy } from "../org-policy/schema.js";
import { type TrustSource } from "../trust/fetch.js";
import { type EccMaterializationTarget } from "./materialization-target.js";
export interface GovernedEccMaterializationInput {
    catalog: BaselineCatalog;
    source: TrustSource;
    /** The parsed governed policy, already read through the product's own reader. */
    policy: OrgPolicy;
    /** {@link governedEccComponentIds}, resolved by the caller BEFORE the source. */
    componentIds: readonly string[];
    /**
     * The requested governed targets, narrowed by
     * `assertGovernedMaterializationTargets` BEFORE the source is resolved — a
     * target this lifecycle refuses must create no quarantine.
     */
    targets: readonly EccMaterializationTarget[];
}
/**
 * The component ids the policy selected for this framework — the identity the
 * evidence gate verifies and the selection resolver matches on. An id the
 * catalog does not carry is refused here, by name: the alternative is a raw
 * catalog error that never mentions the policy the id came from.
 *
 * Also the provenance gate. Each item's `source.repository`/`source.commit` is
 * the POLICY'S CLAIM about where its bytes came from, and it flows verbatim into
 * the materialization receipt (`materialization-selection.ts:191-197`) — while
 * the bytes actually come from the catalog pin this run verifies against. When
 * those disagree the receipt would assert a provenance nothing checked, so the
 * run refuses and names both values. The authoring surface derives the claim
 * from this same catalog identity (`src/org-policy/catalog.ts:388-392`), so an
 * authored policy always agrees; a hand-edited one, a fork, or a stale pin
 * against an `AIH_ECC_REF` override is exactly what this catches.
 *
 * Exported so the caller can validate BEFORE resolving a source: source
 * resolution creates a quarantine directory, and a refusing invocation must
 * create nothing.
 */
export declare function governedEccComponentIds(policy: OrgPolicy, catalog: BaselineCatalog): string[];
/**
 * Run the governed framework lifecycle's install verb. The caller has already
 * proved the repository is governed and resolved the pinned source; this owns
 * the evidence run and the chain that follows it.
 */
export declare function executeGovernedEccMaterialization(ctx: PlanContext, input: GovernedEccMaterializationInput, deps?: BaselineEvidencePipelineDeps): Promise<PlanResult>;