/**
 * Zero-dependency privilege drop for secure exec.
 *
 * Node's `spawn({uid,gid})` sets the primary uid/gid but does NOT clear root's
 * SUPPLEMENTARY groups, so the child would keep gid 0 et al. The classic fix is
 * the external `setpriv` (util-linux) binary — but that is NOT guaranteed to
 * exist on minimal hosts (alpine/musl, distroless, slim images), and secure exec
 * must work after a plain curl/npm install with NOTHING else to install.
 *
 * So we drop privilege IN-PROCESS using the agent's own bundled Node runtime:
 * the agent re-execs ITSELF (`process.execPath`) with the SENTINEL sub-command;
 * that child, still root, calls initgroups → setgid → setuid (exactly what
 * `setpriv --init-groups` does: supplementary groups reset to the target user's
 * own from /etc/group, root's groups dropped) and only THEN execs the target.
 * Works identically for the npm install (`node agent.js …`) and the single
 * self-contained binary (`agent …`) because execPath always points at a working
 * runtime — no external program, no PATH dependency.
 */
export declare const SECURE_EXEC_DROP_SENTINEL = "__secure-exec-drop";
/**
 * Build the argv to re-exec THIS runtime with the drop sub-command. Handles both
 * launch shapes:
 *  - single self-contained binary (SEA): `binary __secure-exec-drop …` — argv[1]
 *    is a normal arg, no script to re-pass.
 *  - `node /path/agent.js …`: argv[1] is the script we MUST re-pass so the child
 *    Node loads it again. We re-pass argv[1] unconditionally regardless of its
 *    extension (extensionless global/npm bin shims have no `.js` suffix).
 */
export declare function buildDropReexec(extra: string[]): {
    cmd: string;
    args: string[];
};
/**
 * If `argv` carries the drop sentinel IN THE EXPECTED POSITION, perform the
 * privilege drop + exec the target and return true (the caller MUST then do
 * nothing else — this process is now the sandboxed command and will process.exit
 * with the child's code). Returns false for a normal agent launch.
 *
 * The sentinel is honoured ONLY as the FIRST real argument of our own re-exec —
 * never anywhere else in argv — so a stray token in a normal CLI invocation
 * (e.g. `status __secure-exec-drop …`) can NOT dispatch the drop parser:
 *   - single self-contained binary: `binary __secure-exec-drop …` → argv[1]
 *   - node+script:                  `node agent.js __secure-exec-drop …` → argv[2]
 *
 * Sentinel payload (immediately after the matched sentinel): uid gid username bin
 * [args…]. Runs as root on entry; fails closed (exit 127) on any privilege-drop
 * error so a misconfigured host can never silently run the command AS ROOT.
 */
export declare function maybeRunSecureExecDrop(argv: string[]): boolean;