---
at: 2026-09-03T20:17:03-07:00
reviewer: codex-subagent
independent: true
task: T-FIX-cancel-throw-v2
attempt: 1
round: 1
verdict: approved
blocking_findings: 0
handoff: fix-cancel-throw-v2-T-FIX-cancel-throw-v2-a1-handoff.json
handoff_sha256: 3e41e6b10cb818567cd7801b4b1d9598ec3b29fcb9788a4278253773a944e5ab
scope:
  - experiments/js-orchestration/review-invocation-v3.test.mjs
  - experiments/js-orchestration/task-runner.mjs
---

# Findings

Zero findings; no blocking findings were found in the two-file correction, its
regression, the corrected review envelope, or the independently exercised recovery
behavior.

# Correctness and cancellation causality

The authorization catch in `task-runner.mjs:321-324` now preserves the state when an
explicit cancellation has already won or the shared controller is aborted. In the
reviewed sequence, `runner.cancel()` first persists the authoritative `control`
record and establishes `cancelled/cancelled`; the catch then returns before the
competing `unknown/authorization_invalid` classification, allowing the enclosing
effect to write its normal checkpoint. The guard is before registration and adapter
dispatch and does not alter grant validation, invocation result handling, receipt or
completion authority, or the durable record schema.

The new test at `review-invocation-v3.test.mjs:160-169` exercises the formerly failing
cancel-then-throw sequence and checks the material contract: terminal
`cancelled/cancelled`, zero dispatch, no invocation registration/diagnostic, exact
durable suffix `effect-intent -> control -> effect-checkpoint`, and byte-equivalent
state after reopening the real local execution store. This is a behavioral recovery
test rather than an assertion tied only to the new conditional.

# Ordinary-error separation

A separate local synthetic probe used a genuine `openTaskExecutionStore` with an
authorization callback that throws without cancelling. It completed as
`unknown/authorization_invalid`, recorded no `control` or invocation registration,
performed zero adapter dispatches, wrote only
`effect-intent -> effect-checkpoint`, retained `cancellationRequested: false`, and
resumed identically. The correction therefore does not mask ordinary authorization
errors or invent cancellation authority.

# Verification

- Current product hashes exactly matched the handoff:
  - `task-runner.mjs` — `9224a6007142f44b1f624cd76bc3848e7441ad97bda03c75ffeae46bf2baf626`
  - `review-invocation-v3.test.mjs` — `8450d76555adff7dc84b03d873a447f1ef96dd06a05c1c1c2ce5580c9aa20dcb`
- The handoff bytes matched SHA-256
  `3e41e6b10cb818567cd7801b4b1d9598ec3b29fcb9788a4278253773a944e5ab`.
- The repository-supported N4 invocation independently returned
  `ready_for_review` for task attempt 1 with that same handoff SHA-256.
- `node --test experiments/js-orchestration/review-invocation-v3.test.mjs` — exit 0,
  **30/30 passed** independently.
- `node --check` on each scoped product file — exit 0.
- The ordinary-throw recovery probe above — exit 0 and all assertions passed; it
  used only synthetic temporary local data and made no provider call.
- The handoff reports the full Node suite at **964/964** and the runtime/public/diff/
  shell gates as passed. Those broader author results were not independently rerun
  in this focused review. The exact five pre-existing public-safety findings remain
  disclosed, outside the two-file scope, and unwaived.

# Scope and residual risk

The reviewed bytes and accepted handoff are limited to the two declared product
files. No durable schema, authorization-grant shape, registration protocol, receipt,
completion, provider, installation, Git, or F01 behavior expansion was found. The
files are untracked relative to the current repository index, so a Git diff cannot
serve as independent task-delta evidence; this review is instead bound to the full
current file contents and their exact hashes. That dirty-tree limitation does not
weaken the behavioral assertions above, but the approval becomes invalid if either
reviewed file or the handoff changes.

The unchanged V3 boundary remains: this is local host-trust fixture evidence, not
remote provenance, real-provider authorization, remote cancellation, billing-stop,
installed-runtime, CI/platform, or completion-authority evidence. The five existing
public-safety findings remain a separate unwaived risk and are not cleared by this
approval.

# Learning check

The scoped lesson is supported: a reentrant trusted host callback must preserve an
already durable explicit cancellation on both normal and exceptional exits before
dispatch. No `AGENTS.md` edit is needed for this correction, and this reviewer did
not modify product code or project learning state.

# Verdict and next action

**Approved with zero findings/no blocking findings.** The next action is for the main
executor to run the repository's N5 check against this exact handoff and review, then
continue the cm-fix regression and closeout sequence only if the content-bound gate
passes. Any change to either scoped product file, this handoff, or execution
instructions requires a fresh review.
