import type { Address, Hex } from '@agenticprimitives/types';
export type { Address, Hex };
export type RiskTier = 'low' | 'medium' | 'high' | 'critical';
export interface ToolClassification {
    '@sa-tool': 'delegation-verified' | 'service-only' | 'bootstrap' | 'dev-only';
    '@sa-auth': 'session-token' | 'service-hmac' | 'none' | 'none-with-csrf';
    '@sa-validation'?: 'shape-check' | 'json-schema' | 'none-no-body' | 'none-path-params' | 'wallet-action-canonical';
    '@sa-risk-tier'?: RiskTier;
    '@sa-owner'?: string;
    '@sa-rate-limit'?: string;
    '@sa-prod-gate'?: 'enabled' | 'disabled';
}
export interface ExactCallPolicy {
    target: Address;
    selector: Hex;
    calldataHash?: Hex;
    valueLimit?: bigint;
}
export interface CaveatLike {
    enforcer: Address;
    terms: Hex;
}
export interface DelegationLike {
    delegator: Address;
    delegate: Address;
    caveats: CaveatLike[];
}
export interface CaveatContext {
    timestamp: number;
    mcpTool?: string;
    target?: Address;
    selector?: Hex;
    value?: bigint;
    principal?: Address;
}
export interface PolicyContext {
    toolName: string;
    classification: ToolClassification;
    delegation?: DelegationLike;
    caveatContext?: CaveatContext;
    callerKind: 'user-session' | 'agent-session' | 'service';
    callDetails?: {
        to: Address;
        data: Hex;
        value: bigint;
    };
}
export type PolicyDecision = {
    decision: 'allow';
} | {
    decision: 'deny';
    reason: string;
} | {
    decision: 'requires-consent';
    promptId: string;
    risk: RiskTier;
};
export interface LintResult {
    passed: boolean;
    errors: Array<{
        file: string;
        line: number;
        missing: string[];
    }>;
}
export declare enum ThresholdTier {
    Read = 1,// T1 — view-shape MCP delegation, no on-chain mutation
    Write = 2,// T2 — mutates state but no value transfer above T3 ceiling
    Value = 3,// T3 — token / native value transfer; requires quorum + (high-value) on-chain blessing
    Admin = 4,// T4 — owner / passkey / guardian / mode mutation; account-level (not exposed by evaluateThresholdPolicy)
    Critical = 5,// T5 — impl upgrade / DM change / paymaster change; account-level + timelock
    Recovery = 6
}
/**
 * Decision returned by `evaluateThresholdPolicy(classification)` —
 * the shape mcp-runtime's withDelegation threads into
 * `verifyDelegationToken` so the verify path knows what to enforce.
 *
 * - `tier`: which spec 207 § 5 tier the tool falls into. T1-T3 only;
 *   T4-T6 are account-level admin tiers, not tool-call tiers.
 * - `requiresQuorum`: the delegation MUST carry a QuorumEnforcer caveat.
 *   True for T3+ (per spec § 5 multisig/org rows).
 * - `requiresUv`: at least one signer must have presented a passkey UV
 *   (user-verification) flag. True for T2+ (per spec § 5 hybrid rows).
 * - `requiresAcceptedOnChain`: the account must have called
 *   `acceptSessionDelegation(hash)` for this delegation. True for the
 *   high-value T3 path (per spec § 6 + § 5 critical-risk-tier).
 */
export interface ThresholdPolicyDecision {
    tier: ThresholdTier;
    requiresQuorum: boolean;
    requiresUv: boolean;
    requiresAcceptedOnChain: boolean;
}
//# sourceMappingURL=types.d.ts.map