import { type Hex } from 'viem';
import type { BuildDescriptorInput, ContentCommitment, ContentDescriptor, DelegatingSigner, DelegatedAuthorityVerifier, SignatureVerifier } from './types.js';
/**
 * The frozen Phase-1 normalization profile id (spec 266 §7). Rules of
 * `canonical-text-v1`: NFC; trim leading/trailing whitespace; collapse internal
 * whitespace runs to a single space; text body only (verse numbers, labels,
 * footnotes, headings, cross-refs, formatting are excluded by the caller before
 * commitment); digest SHA-256 over UTF-8. Bump the version to change any rule.
 */
export declare const NORMALIZATION_V1 = "ap:normalization:canonical-text-v1";
/** Apply the canonical-text-v1 normalization to a rendering body. */
export declare function canonicalizeRendering(text: string): string;
/**
 * Structured commitment to an off-platform rendering (spec 266 §7):
 * SHA-256 of the canonical-text-v1-normalized body. SHA-256 (not keccak) keeps
 * the content commitment portable/standard; it is verified off-chain and never
 * stored on-chain (ADR-0033 R3). Binds a descriptor to a rendering WITHOUT
 * revealing it.
 */
export declare function contentCommitment(text: string): ContentCommitment;
/** True iff `text` canonicalizes+hashes to the commitment value. */
export declare function verifyCommitment(text: string, commitment: ContentCommitment): boolean;
/** Throwing variant of {@link verifyCommitment}. */
export declare function assertCommitment(text: string, commitment: ContentCommitment): void;
/**
 * Deterministic, domain-separated hash of the unsigned descriptor — both its
 * cryptographic identity (ContentDescriptorId) AND the ERC-1271 signing
 * preimage. `keccak256("ap:content-descriptor:v1\0" || JCS(unsigned))`. The
 * domain separator keeps it from ever colliding with a canonical-locus id.
 */
export declare function descriptorHash(d: BuildDescriptorInput): Hex;
/**
 * Build a signed {@link ContentDescriptor}. `sign` signs {@link descriptorHash} — either as the issuer's
 * own Smart Agent (ERC-1271), or, when `delegatingSigner` is given, as the issuer-AUTHORIZED operational
 * key (e.g. Cloud KMS). The attached `delegatingSigner` lets a verifier root trust in the issuer SA while
 * the day-to-day signing key is delegated/rotatable (no issuer custodian key held).
 */
export declare function buildContentDescriptor(input: BuildDescriptorInput, sign: (hash: Hex) => Promise<Hex> | Hex, delegatingSigner?: DelegatingSigner): Promise<ContentDescriptor>;
export interface VerifyDescriptorOpts {
    /** Verifies an ERC-1271/ECDSA signature by a signer (injected; ADR-0006). */
    verifySignature: SignatureVerifier;
    /** Verifies an issuer→delegate authorization leaf — REQUIRED when the descriptor carries
     *  `delegatingSigner` (else delegate-signed descriptors fail closed). Injected (ADR-0006). */
    verifyDelegatedAuthority?: DelegatedAuthorityVerifier;
    /** Required when proofPolicy is `merkle-membership-v1`. */
    corpusRoot?: Hex;
    inclusionProof?: Hex[];
    /** Current time (seconds) for validity/status checks; defaults to now. */
    nowSeconds?: number;
}
/** Result of {@link verifyContentDescriptor} — an auditable VerificationResult. */
export interface VerificationResult {
    ok: boolean;
    reason?: string;
    signatureVerified: boolean;
    statusOk: boolean;
    withinValidity: boolean;
    inclusionVerified?: boolean;
}
/**
 * Verify a descriptor fail-closed (spec 266 §7): status must be `active`, the
 * validity window must contain `now`, the issuer ERC-1271 signature over the
 * canonical descriptor hash must verify, and — for `merkle-membership-v1` — the
 * commitment must prove under `corpusRoot`. Reserved proof policies are rejected.
 */
export declare function verifyContentDescriptor(d: ContentDescriptor, opts: VerifyDescriptorOpts): Promise<VerificationResult>;
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