/**
 * AgentGuard® — model-agnostic provenance that survives hot-swap.
 *
 * The "headless" / model-fungibility problem (raised on All-In E280): teams want
 * to hot-swap models — frontier → open-weight → self-hosted — per task to cut
 * cost, but "no one has figured out how to abstract memory/context/AUDIT away
 * from the model." A provider console can't help: it only sees its own tokens,
 * and the trail breaks the moment you route to a different provider.
 *
 * AgentGuard's signed decision log already records, per call, which model served
 * it (provenance) inside one continuous hash chain. This module reads that log
 * and produces a PORTABLE, model-agnostic provenance manifest per workload: the
 * ordered model lineage, every swap, the frontier/dark origin mix, and a single
 * tamper-evidence verdict that spans the whole swap sequence. The audit is keyed
 * to the workload, not the model — so it survives the swap.
 *
 * Honest scope note (same as the dashboard): the signed SpendDecision does not
 * carry a first-class workload/agent id (only `triggeredScopeKey`). Callers pass
 * a `keyOf` selector to group; the default uses `triggeredScopeKey`. We never
 * invent a grouping the ledger does not support.
 *
 * Patent notice: signed hash-chained decision log (U.S. application filed May
 * 2026); composes with DAG Trust Attestation, Patent D §7.3 (App. No.
 * 63/984,626). AgentGuard® is a U.S. registered trademark (Reg. No. 8281464) of
 * Dunecrest Ventures Inc.
 */
import type { SignedDecisionLogEntry, SpendDecision } from '../types';
import { type TokenOrigin } from '../dashboard/aggregate';
export interface ModelUse {
    model: string;
    origin: TokenOrigin;
    provider: string;
    calls: number;
    cents: number;
}
export interface ModelSwap {
    atSequence: number;
    fromModel: string;
    toModel: string;
    fromOrigin: TokenOrigin;
    toOrigin: TokenOrigin;
    /** True when the swap crossed the frontier↔dark boundary (the audit-risky kind). */
    crossesBoundary: boolean;
}
export interface WorkloadProvenance {
    key: string;
    calls: number;
    spentCents: number;
    frontierCents: number;
    darkCents: number;
    firstAt: string | null;
    lastAt: string | null;
    models: ModelUse[];
    /** Ordered model lineage, e.g. ['claude-5','gpt-5-mini','glm-5.2']. */
    lineage: string[];
    swaps: ModelSwap[];
}
export interface WorkloadProvenanceReport {
    workloads: WorkloadProvenance[];
    /** Chain-level tamper evidence spans ALL swaps — the point of the manifest. */
    continuity: {
        verified: boolean;
        entries: number;
        reason?: string;
    };
}
/**
 * Build the portable per-workload provenance manifest from signed ledger
 * entries. Pass the async `verifyChain` result as `continuity` so this stays a
 * pure, synchronous function (never null-continuity in production — a manifest
 * without tamper evidence is not the product).
 */
export declare function workloadProvenance(entries: SignedDecisionLogEntry[], continuity?: WorkloadProvenanceReport['continuity'], keyOf?: (d: SpendDecision) => string): WorkloadProvenanceReport;
/** Human-readable lineage, e.g. "claude-5 → gpt-5-mini → glm-5.2". */
export declare const formatLineage: (w: WorkloadProvenance) => string;
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