import * as jose from "jose";
import "../authorization/check-action.js";
import type { A2AConfig, AgentSkill } from "./types.js";
/**
 * Result of verifying an inbound A2A JWT. `email` is present for deployment
 * user assertions or an explicitly opted-in org-member delegation. `orgDomain`
 * and `orgId` are bound to local organization metadata when present.
 */
export interface A2ATokenPayload {
    email: string | null;
    orgDomain: string | null;
    orgId?: string;
    identityAssurance?: "user" | "organization" | "org-member";
    claims?: jose.JWTPayload;
}
export declare class A2AIdentityVerificationUnavailableError extends Error {
    readonly cause: unknown;
    constructor(cause: unknown);
}
export declare function isA2AIdentityVerificationUnavailableError(error: unknown): error is A2AIdentityVerificationUnavailableError;
/**
 * Verify an inbound A2A bearer token (HS256) exactly as the
 * `/_agent-native/a2a` endpoint does: it peeks at the unverified `org_domain`
 * claim to locate an org credential after trying the global credential, then
 * verifies the JWT — checking
 * `aud`/`iss` when the token carries them and `exp` always. Returns the
 * caller's email (`sub`) and org domain on success, or an organization-only
 * identity with no email when an org secret verifies. Invalid tokens return
 * `{ email: null, orgDomain: null }`. If the organization credential cannot
 * be read, throws
 * `A2AIdentityVerificationUnavailableError` so callers cannot treat an
 * unreadable authorization lookup as an unauthenticated fallback.
 *
 * Exported so workspaces can accept A2A callers on the HTTP action route with
 * the same routine — including organization-only credentials — instead of
 * reimplementing a partial verifier. Pass the H3 `event` to enable org-domain →
 * org-secret lookup and audience derivation; it is optional. A custom mounted
 * JSON-RPC route also passes its prefix so endpoint-bound tokens verify against
 * the same audience the client derived from the advertised URL.
 */
export declare function verifyA2AToken(token: string, event?: any, audienceOptions?: {
    routePrefix?: string;
    /** Trusted audience(s) supplied by the mounted route that is verifying the token. */
    expectedAudience?: string | string[];
    allowBaseAudience?: boolean;
    includeClaims?: boolean;
    /** Only use the deployment-wide secret, never an org-domain secret. */
    globalSecretOnly?: boolean;
    /** Only use this explicitly configured credential; never fall back. */
    verificationSecret?: string;
    /** Dedicated verifier for the typed Anthropic continuation credential. */
    allowAnthropicManagedContinuation?: boolean;
    requireAudience?: boolean;
}): Promise<A2ATokenPayload>;
export type A2ATokenFailureCause = "malformed" | "secret-missing" | "audience-unresolvable" | "audience" | "issuer" | "expired" | "signature" | "algorithm" | "invalid-claims" | "mcp-credential" | "missing-subject" | "org-binding" | "org-lookup-failed" | "undetermined";
/**
 * Names why a token that `verifyA2AToken` resolved no identity for was
 * refused. `verifyA2AToken` collapses a wrong audience, a wrong secret and an
 * unbound organization into one empty identity; this re-checks the same inputs,
 * against the deploy secret and then the organization's, to tell them apart.
 * Diagnostic only: it never grants anything, and its answer must not be used as
 * an authorization result.
 */
export declare function diagnoseA2ATokenFailure(token: string, event?: any): Promise<A2ATokenFailureCause>;
export declare function mountA2A(nitroApp: any, config: A2AConfig, routePrefix?: string): void;
export declare function filterPublicAgentCardSkills(config: A2AConfig): AgentSkill[];