/**
 * Local encrypted secret store.
 *
 * Storage layout (both files under `getConfigDir()`, honoring
 * `SPECTRAL_CONFIG_DIR` for tests):
 *  - `<configDir>/secrets.key`      32 random bytes, mode 0600 — AES-256 key
 *  - `<configDir>/secrets.json.enc` AES-256-GCM encrypted JSON, mode 0600
 *
 * Encrypted file layout:
 *  - bytes 0-7:   magic `"SPSECRT1"` (format tag)
 *  - bytes 8-19:  12-byte random IV
 *  - bytes 20-35: 16-byte GCM auth tag
 *  - bytes 36+:   ciphertext (UTF-8 JSON)
 *
 * Security rules enforced here and by this module's consumers:
 *  - `listSecrets()` returns ONLY `{ name, createdAt, updatedAt }` — values are
 *    never part of any listing.
 *  - `getSecretValue()` is INTERNAL: it is consumed only by
 *    `getSecretEnvVars()` (env-var injection into the agent's bash tool). It
 *    is deliberately NOT re-exported from `./index.js`, so neither the relay
 *    handlers nor the LLM-facing tool surface can reach it.
 *  - No caller ever logs a value; error messages and listings carry names only.
 *
 * All I/O is synchronous by design: `getSecretEnvVars()` must be callable from
 * the sync `getShellEnv()` in `src/sdk/coding-agent/utils/shell.ts`. The store
 * is tiny (values are capped at 64 KiB each), so sync reads are negligible.
 *
 * Keep this module zero-side-effect on import: nothing touches the filesystem
 * until one of the exported functions is called.
 */
/** Secret names: start with a letter, then letters/digits/underscores, max 64 chars. */
export declare const SECRET_NAME_PATTERN: RegExp;
/** Maximum UTF-8 byte size of a secret value (64 KiB). */
export declare const MAX_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES: number;
/** Metadata-safe view of a secret: NEVER includes the value. */
export interface SecretMeta {
    name: string;
    createdAt: string;
    updatedAt: string;
}
/** Thrown when a secret name is missing/invalid after normalization. */
export declare class SecretNameError extends Error {
    constructor(message: string);
}
/** Thrown when a secret value exceeds `MAX_SECRET_VALUE_BYTES`. */
export declare class SecretValueError extends Error {
    constructor(message: string);
}
/** Thrown when the encrypted store is unreadable, corrupt, or key-mismatched. */
export declare class SecretStoreCorruptError extends Error {
    constructor(message: string);
}
/** Path to the AES-256 key file (32 random bytes). Lazily computed — see `getConfigDir`. */
export declare function getSecretKeyPath(): string;
/** Path to the AES-256-GCM encrypted store. Lazily computed — see `getConfigDir`. */
export declare function getSecretDataPath(): string;
/**
 * Normalize a secret name per the shared contract: trim surrounding
 * whitespace, uppercase, then validate against `SECRET_NAME_PATTERN`.
 * Throws `SecretNameError` with a generic message — the offending raw input
 * is never echoed back, so it can't leak into logs.
 */
export declare function normalizeSecretName(raw: string): string;
/**
 * Return the secret env vars (name → value) for injection into the agent
 * shell environment. Synchronous, mtime-cached: new/updated/deleted secrets
 * are picked up on the next call without a CLI restart.
 *
 * Failure modes degrade gracefully — a corrupt store, missing key, or unreadable
 * file returns `{}` instead of throwing, because `getShellEnv()` is sync and
 * must never break bash spawning. No values are ever logged.
 */
export declare function getSecretEnvVars(): Record<string, string>;
/**
 * Create or update a secret. Returns the metadata-only view (never the value).
 * Throws `SecretNameError` for invalid names, `SecretValueError` for oversized
 * values, and `SecretStoreCorruptError` when the store cannot be read/written.
 *
 * Fully synchronous (no awaits): the read-modify-write below is atomic per
 * event-loop turn, so concurrent relay POSTs in one process can never
 * interleave — no mutex is needed. Cross-process writers are isolated by the
 * unique per-request tmp name + rename in `writeStoreData`; the last rename
 * wins and every writer re-reads the store on its next call.
 */
export declare function setSecret(rawName: string, value: string): SecretMeta;
/**
 * Delete a secret. Returns true when a record was removed, false when the
 * name was not stored. Throws `SecretNameError` for invalid names.
 */
export declare function deleteSecret(rawName: string): boolean;
/**
 * List secrets as metadata only — `{ name, createdAt, updatedAt }`. Values are
 * never part of the returned shape (this is the source for the relay GET
 * response and the `list_secrets` agent tool).
 */
export declare function listSecrets(): SecretMeta[];
/**
 * INTERNAL — read a single secret value. Used ONLY for env-var injection via
 * `getSecretEnvVars()`. Deliberately not re-exported from `./index.js` so it
 * cannot be reached from the relay handlers or the LLM-facing tool surface.
 * Never log the return value.
 */
export declare function getSecretValue(rawName: string): string | undefined;
/**
 * Remove the store + key (test helper and future "reset secrets" support).
 * Returns true when either file was deleted.
 */
export declare function resetSecretStore(): boolean;
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