/**
 * Brainstorm Guard Layer (Phase 2)
 *
 * Pure functions that return {ok, reason} for the four brainstorm checkpoints.
 * Every guard is intentionally side-effect-free — callers wire them in at
 * the right place and surface the reason to the user.
 *
 * Guards:
 *   1. guardSeedInput      — refuse /senai-brainstorm with empty seed.
 *   2. guardBriefContent   — refuse finalize when brief still has _TBD_ placeholders.
 *   3. guardArtifactPath   — refuse writes outside the dedicated brainstorm folder.
 *   4. guardDispatchCount  — refuse subagent dispatch when count would exceed cap.
 */
import { type MissionType, type SenaiState } from "../core/state.js";
/** Result type returned by every guard. `ok: true` means proceed;
 *  `ok: false` means block, with a human-readable reason. */
export interface GuardResult {
    ok: boolean;
    reason?: string;
    /** Optional structured details — used by tests + doctor to surface specifics. */
    details?: string[];
}
/** Max subagent dispatches allowed per brainstorm. Keeps token spend bounded. */
export declare const BRAINSTORM_DISPATCH_CAP = 3;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  1. Seed input guard
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Refuse empty seed input at /senai-brainstorm entry.
 *
 *  The parent LLM needs at least one signal (topic, insight, goal, question)
 *  to anchor the Q&A. Without a seed the parent would guess the user's
 *  intent — exactly the failure mode brainstorm is supposed to prevent.
 *
 *  Whitespace-only counts as empty. */
export declare function guardSeedInput(args: string): GuardResult;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  2. Brief content guard
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Refuse to finalize a brief whose sections still carry `_TBD_` placeholders
 *  or empty bodies. Hard reject — the user must fill the gaps before approve
 *  succeeds. The soft "Finalize anyway?" dialog is removed.
 *
 *  When a missionType is given, the check runs against that type's required
 *  section list (bugfix adds the 4 pack sections) via
 *  validateBriefContentForType; otherwise it delegates to
 *  validateBriefContent against the base 6 — single-arg calls are unchanged. */
export declare function guardBriefContent(brief: string, missionType?: MissionType): GuardResult;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  3. Artifact path guard
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Refuse to write any artifact outside the dedicated brainstorm folder
 *  for the active run. The path must resolve to a descendant of
 *  `.IDE_Plans/pi-senai/Brainstorm/<brainstormRunId>/`. Path traversal
 *  (`..`) is rejected explicitly. */
export declare function guardArtifactPath(artifactPath: string, brainstormRunId: string): GuardResult;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  4. Dispatch count guard
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Refuse subagent dispatch when the count would exceed the per-brainstorm
 *  cap. The cap protects the parent context from ballooning and keeps the
 *  audit log focused on the most consequential decisions. */
export declare function guardDispatchCount(count: number): GuardResult;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  5. Approve readiness guard (new brainstorm flow lock)
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Hard-block /senai-brainstorm-approve while the new-flow brainstorm is
 *  unfinished: the user must have confirmed the parent's understanding
 *  (UNDERSTAND → CONFIRM loop) and every question must be in a terminal
 *  state (agreed / not-wanted / replaced). "draft" and "discussing" block.
 *
 *  Legacy exemption: a brainstorm session that never entered the new flow
 *  (no missionType recorded) keeps the old approve behavior so in-flight
 *  sessions started before this guard existed are never wedged. */
export declare function guardApproveReadiness(state: SenaiState): GuardResult;
/** ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 *  6. Brainstorm mutation gate (hard enforcement, tool_call hook)
 *  ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
/** Block edit/write tool calls outside the active brainstorm folder while a
 *  new-flow brainstorm is still open (brief not finalized). The brainstorm
 *  stages are read-only for the project — the only allowed writes are the
 *  brief, scout-notes, and discussion docs inside Brainstorm/<id>/.
 *
 *  Lifts automatically when:
 *  - no brainstorm is active (no brainstormRunId), or
 *  - the session is legacy (no missionType — old-flow exemption), or
 *  - the brief is finalized (draft marker stripped by approve).
 *
 *  Bash is intentionally NOT gated (no reliable target path; the spawn
 *  guard already covers subagent misuse). Returns the pi tool_call block
 *  shape ({ block, reason }) or undefined to allow. Fail-open on any I/O
 *  error — a guard bug must never wedge every edit in the session. */
export declare function guardBrainstormMutation(toolName: string, input: Record<string, unknown> | undefined, cwd: string): {
    block: true;
    reason: string;
} | undefined;