import { AttestationError, thumbprintFromPeerCert, thumbprintFromForwardedClientCert, type VerifyOptions, type AttestationClaims } from '@adastracomputing/aer-resource-node';
export { AttestationError, thumbprintFromPeerCert, thumbprintFromForwardedClientCert };
export type { AttestationClaims, VerifyOptions };
/** JSON-RPC error code for "attestation required" (implementation-defined range). */
export declare const MCP_ATTESTATION_ERROR_CODE = -32001;
export type JsonRpcId = string | number | null;
export interface JsonRpcError {
    jsonrpc: '2.0';
    id: JsonRpcId;
    error: {
        code: number;
        message: string;
        data: {
            reason: string;
        };
    };
}
export interface GuardOptions extends Omit<VerifyOptions, 'now'> {
    /** Also accept `Authorization: Bearer`. Default false (X-AER-Attestation only). */
    allowBearer?: boolean;
    /** Clock injection for tests (ms). */
    now?: () => number;
    /**
     * Resolve the presented client-cert thumbprint per request (when `requireMtls`).
     * Receives the header getter - use it to read a forwarded client-cert header
     * (`thumbprintFromForwardedClientCert`) behind a TRUSTED proxy. For DIRECT mTLS,
     * resolve from the socket in your handler and pass `mtlsThumbprint` instead.
     * ⚠️ Only read a forwarded cert header behind a proxy you control.
     */
    resolveMtlsThumbprint?: (getHeader: (name: string) => string | null | undefined) => string | null | Promise<string | null>;
}
export type GuardResult = {
    ok: true;
    claims: AttestationClaims;
} | {
    ok: false;
    status: number;
    jsonRpcError: JsonRpcError;
};
type HeaderGetter = (name: string) => string | null | undefined;
/**
 * HTTP status for a denial reason:
 *  - 403  token is authentic but lacks authority: revoked / introspection says
 *         inactive / insufficient_scope (RFC 6750 maps insufficient_scope → 403)
 *  - 503  introspection unreachable + fail-closed, or the JWKS unreachable
 *         (jwks_unavailable): the guard could not decide (liveness unknown - not the
 *         client's fault, and the token may well be valid)
 *  - 401  everything else: missing / malformed / bad signature / expired /
 *         wrong audience / wrong issuer / DPoP proof failures (RFC 9449 uses 401
 *         with a DPoP challenge - dpop_required / dpop_invalid / dpop_replay)
 */
export declare function statusForReason(reason: string): number;
/**
 * Framework-neutral guard. Reads the attestation header, verifies it (offline +
 * optional introspection), and returns either the claims or a ready-to-send
 * JSON-RPC denial + HTTP status. Never reads the request body - pass `rpcId`
 * only if the body was already parsed by your framework (else leave it null so
 * streaming/SSE bodies are untouched).
 */
export declare function guardMcpRequest(getHeader: HeaderGetter, opts: GuardOptions, rpcId?: JsonRpcId): Promise<GuardResult>;
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