/**
* Rejects an attribute name that should never survive a raw DOM clone of consumer-supplied SVG
* content (`<lr-icon>`'s and `<lr-icon-button>`'s slotted custom-content path -- unlike a fetched
* `src` document, which is sanitized through DOMPurify before it ever reaches the DOM, a slotted
* clone has no sanitizer in the loop, so this predicate is that path's own trust boundary).
* Event-handler content attributes (`on*`) execute as inline JS once connected; `href`/
* `xlink:href` on an SVG `<a>`/`<use>`/`<image>` can carry a `javascript:` URI or reference an
* external resource. Every other presentational attribute (`d`, `fill`, `stroke`, `viewBox`,
* `transform`, gradient stops, …) is left untouched -- this is a denylist, not an allowlist,
* because SVG's legitimate presentation-attribute vocabulary is too large to enumerate without
* silently breaking real icon markup.
*/
export declare function isUnsafeSvgCloneAttribute(name:string):boolean;