Does Shutting Down Dark Web Markets Kill People?

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Abstract

In July 2017, coordinated law enforcement action shut down AlphaBay and Hansa, two of the largest darknet drug marketplaces. Cryptocurrency data confirms the takedowns had immediate impact: transaction volumes to darknet markets fell approximately 60%. A plausible hypothesis suggests that forcing users back to street dealers—where product quality and dosing are less reliable—could increase overdose deaths. We test this hypothesis using an interrupted time series (ITS) design with monthly U.S. overdose mortality data from 2015–2019. Contrary to expectations, we find no evidence that the takedowns accelerated overdose deaths. Instead, we observe a *deceleration* in the growth rate of synthetic opioid deaths post-intervention. However, three lines of evidence suggest this pattern is not causally attributable to the takedowns: (1) placebo tests reveal similar "effects" at multiple non-intervention dates; (2) state-level analysis shows massive heterogeneity ($I^2 = 99\%$), with only 20% of states showing July 2017 as the most extreme date; and (3) darknet market activity recovered within six months, limiting the window during which users lacked online alternatives. Our findings suggest the observed trends reflect broader opioid epidemic dynamics rather than enforcement effects.

1 Introduction

The opioid crisis has claimed over 500,000 American lives since 1999, with synthetic opioids—primarily illicit fentanyl—driving a sharp acceleration in deaths after 2013 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2020). Concurrently, darknet marketplaces emerged as significant venues for drug transactions, with platforms like Silk Road, AlphaBay, and Hansa facilitating billions of dollars in illicit trade.

A controversial hypothesis in drug policy suggests that darknet markets may inadvertently provide harm reduction benefits. Unlike street dealers, darknet vendors operate under reputation systems, face customer reviews, and have incentives to provide accurate product descriptions and consistent dosing (Martin, 2014). AlphaBay even banned fentanyl sales and offered vendor fee waivers for including naloxone with shipments. If true, shutting down these marketplaces could perversely *increase* overdose deaths by forcing users to less reliable street sources.

In July 2017, "Operation Bayonet"—a coordinated effort by the FBI, DEA, Europol, and Dutch National Police—seized AlphaBay (July 4) and Hansa (July 20) in quick succession. This created a natural experiment: if the harm-reduction hypothesis holds, we should observe an acceleration in overdose deaths following the takedowns.

We test this hypothesis using an interrupted time series (ITS) design with CDC mortality data. Our analysis finds no evidence supporting the hypothesis—and if anything, the opposite pattern. However, we also demonstrate that the observed trends are not uniquely attributable to the July 2017 intervention.

2 Background

2.1 AlphaBay, Hansa, and Operation Bayonet

AlphaBay launched in 2014 and quickly became the largest darknet marketplace, surpassing Silk Road's peak trading volume by tenfold. By 2017, it had over 400,000 users and 40,000 vendors, with drugs comprising the majority of listings (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017).

The coordinated takedown was notable for its sophistication. Dutch police had secretly seized control of Hansa in June 2017 and operated it as a honeypot, collecting user data as vendors and buyers migrated from the collapsing AlphaBay. When both markets were shut simultaneously on July 20, the migration trap captured thousands of user identities.

2.2 Theoretical Mechanism

The hypothesis that marketplace shutdowns could increase overdose deaths rests on several mechanisms:

1. **Product quality**: Darknet vendors face reputation incentives to provide consistent, accurately described products. Street dealers face no such accountability.

2. **Fentanyl contamination**: Street heroin is increasingly adulterated with fentanyl. Darknet markets with fentanyl bans may have provided a "cleaner" supply.

3. **Harm reduction information**: Darknet forums share dosing information, drug checking resources, and harm reduction practices.

4. **Supply disruption**: Sudden supply interruption may push users to unfamiliar sources or riskier consumption patterns.

2.3 Prior Literature

Zambiasi (2022) examined street drug crime following darknet shutdowns and found a short-lived (18-day) increase in marijuana-related crimes, but no effect on violent crime or other drug offenses. Research from the Australian National University found that marketplace seizures dispersed markets and temporarily reduced availability, but vendors quickly migrated to alternative platforms (Australian National University, 2023).

Studies have found significant correlations between darknet drug listings and local overdose rates (Lokala et al., 2019), suggesting a supply-side connection. However, no prior study has directly tested whether enforcement actions causally affect overdose mortality.

3 Data

3.1 Overdose Mortality Data

We use the CDC's Vital Statistics Rapid Release (VSRR) Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts, accessed via the CDC WONDER database. The data provide monthly 12-month rolling death counts by drug type at the national level.

We extract deaths for January 2015 through December 2019, providing 30 months pre-intervention and 30 months post-intervention. Drug categories include:

- Total drug overdose deaths
- Synthetic opioids excluding methadone (T40.4)—primarily fentanyl
- Heroin (T40.1)
- Cocaine (T40.5)
- Natural and semi-synthetic opioids (T40.2)—prescription opioids
- Psychostimulants with abuse potential (T43.6)—primarily methamphetamine

3.2 Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics for monthly death counts, split by the intervention date.

Table 1: Summary Statistics: Monthly Overdose Deaths (12-Month Ending)

	Pre-Intervention		Post-Intervention	
Outcome	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Total Overdose Deaths	56,708	6,937	69,019	1,101
Synthetic Opioid Deaths	13,387	6,105	30,914	2,605
Heroin Deaths	13,756	1,741	15,062	534
Cocaine Deaths	8,230	2,294	14,567	633
N (months)	30		30	

The pre-intervention period shows high variance as deaths were rapidly increasing. The post-intervention period shows higher mean values but lower variance, suggesting the growth rate had stabilized.

4 Methods

4.1 Interrupted Time Series Design

We employ a segmented regression ITS model:

$$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Time}_t + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Post}_t + \beta_3 \cdot (\text{Time}_t \times \text{Post}_t) + \epsilon_t \tag{1}$$

where:

- Y_t = monthly overdose deaths (12-month ending)
- Time_t = months since January 2015 (1, 2, ..., 60)
- $\text{Post}_t = 1$ if $t \geq$ July 2017, else 0
- $\text{Time}_t \times \text{Post}_t$ = interaction term

The parameters are:

- β_0: Intercept (baseline level at $t = 0$)
- β_1: Pre-intervention trend (monthly change before July 2017)
- β_2: Immediate level change at intervention

- β_3: Change in trend (slope) post-intervention

If the takedowns increased overdose mortality, we would expect $\beta_2 > 0$ (immediate jump) and/or $\beta_3 > 0$ (accelerated growth).

4.2 Statistical Inference

Given strong autocorrelation in 12-month rolling data (Ljung-Box test: $p < 0.001$), we report Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors with 6 lags.

4.3 Robustness Checks

We conduct three robustness analyses:

1. **Placebo tests**: Estimate the model at 7 placebo intervention dates (every 6 months from July 2015 to January 2019, excluding July 2017).
2. **Window sensitivity**: Restrict the sample to ± 18, ± 12, and ± 9 months around the intervention.
3. **Seasonality controls**: Include month fixed effects.

5 Results

5.1 Main Findings

Table 2 presents the ITS regression results for all drug categories.

Table 2: Interrupted Time Series Regression Results

Outcome	Level Change (β_2) Estimate	p-value	Slope Change (β_3) Estimate	p-value
Total Overdose Deaths	+26,850	<0.001	−832	<0.001
Synthetic Opioid Deaths	+14,822	<0.001	−387	<0.001
Heroin Deaths	+6,920	<0.001	−253	<0.001
Cocaine Deaths	+7,380	<0.001	−189	<0.001
Natural Opioid Deaths	+7,062	<0.001	−230	<0.001
Psychostimulant Deaths	−2,004	<0.001	+76	<0.001

Notes: Newey-West HAC standard errors with 6 lags. The level change (β_2) represents the difference between the counterfactual pre-trend projection and observed post-intervention values. The slope change (β_3) represents the change in monthly growth rate.

The results are striking but *opposite* to the hypothesis:

- The positive β_2 values indicate that post-intervention death counts exceeded what the pre-intervention trend would predict—but this reflects the *ongoing* epidemic, not an intervention effect.
- The *negative* β_3 values indicate that the growth rate *decelerated* after July 2017. Synthetic opioid deaths were growing by 677 deaths/month pre-intervention; this slowed to 290 deaths/month post-intervention.

Figure 1 visualizes the ITS model for synthetic opioid deaths.



Figure 1: Interrupted Time Series Analysis: Synthetic Opioid Deaths. Black dots show observed monthly deaths. Blue line shows fitted pre-intervention trend; red line shows fitted post-intervention trend. Dashed blue line shows counterfactual projection of pre-intervention trend.

5.2 Placebo Tests

Table 3 presents placebo test results for synthetic opioid deaths.

Table 3: Placebo Tests: Synthetic Opioid Deaths

Intervention Date	β_2	p-value	β_3	p-value
July 2015	−34	0.983	+184	<0.001
January 2016	+1,286	0.575	+162	0.003
July 2016	+4,962	0.041	+22	0.645
January 2017	+10,509	<0.001	−202	<0.001
July 2017 (True)	**+14,822**	**<0.001**	**−387**	**<0.001**
January 2018	+15,585	<0.001	−435	<0.001
July 2018	+14,355	<0.001	−392	<0.001
January 2019	+6,461	0.017	−218	<0.001

The placebo tests reveal a critical limitation: significant effects appear at multiple dates around the true intervention. The pattern suggests a broader inflection point in the epidemic—occurring sometime in late 2016 through mid-2017—rather than a specific response to the July 2017 takedowns.

5.3 Robustness

Window sensitivity analyses confirm the main findings: the deceleration pattern persists across all time windows, with β_3 remaining significantly negative. Including month fixed effects does not substantively change the estimates.

5.4 State-Level Heterogeneity

To examine whether the national pattern is consistent across states or driven by a few large jurisdictions, we extend the ITS analysis to state-level data. Of 51 states and territories, 30 have sufficient synthetic opioid death data ($\geq$50 months of non-suppressed observations) for analysis.

Table 4 summarizes the state-level findings.

Table 4: State-Level ITS Results: Synthetic Opioid Deaths

Statistic	Value
States analyzed	30
Significant negative β_3 (deceleration)	20 (67%)
Significant positive β_3 (acceleration)	8 (27%)
Not significant	2 (7%)
Weighted mean β_3	+0.90
Simple mean β_3	−10.80
I^2 heterogeneity	99.0%

The heterogeneity is striking. While most states show deceleration (negative β_3), eight states—including Tennessee, Arizona, and Washington—show significant *acceleration* in synthetic opioid deaths after July 2017. The I^2 statistic of 99% indicates that nearly all variance across states reflects true heterogeneity rather than sampling error.

Ohio dominates the national pattern with a slope change of −108 deaths/month—far larger than any other state. New York (−46), Maryland (−34), and Massachusetts (−31) also show large decelerations. These few states largely drive the aggregate national finding. Figure 2 visualizes the state-level heterogeneity.



Figure 2: Forest plot of state-level slope changes (β_3) for synthetic opioid deaths. Blue points indicate significant deceleration; red points indicate significant acceleration; gray points are not statistically significant. Note the extreme heterogeneity: Ohio shows a deceleration of -108 deaths/month while Tennessee shows an acceleration of $+10$ deaths/month.

State-level placebo tests. To assess whether July 2017 is uniquely important at the state level, we run placebo tests at six-month intervals for each state. If the takedowns caused the observed patterns, July 2017 should consistently be the most extreme date.

Results show that July 2017 is the most negative date in only 6 of 30 states (20%). The mean z-score comparing the true effect to placebo effects is just -0.47—indicating July 2017 is on average only half a standard deviation more negative than arbitrary placebo dates. This suggests the state-level patterns, like the national pattern, reflect general epidemic dynamics rather than a specific response to the takedowns.

5.5 Cryptocurrency Transaction Volume

The "forced to street dealers" hypothesis requires that darknet market users lost access to online drug purchasing after the takedowns. We examine this assumption using cryptocurrency transaction data from Chainalysis, a blockchain analytics firm that tracks illicit Bitcoin flows.

Box 1: How Chainalysis Measures Darknet Market Activity

Chainalysis tracks cryptocurrency flows to darknet markets through several methods:

1. **Wallet identification**: Addresses belonging to known darknet markets are identified through clustering heuristics and open-source intelligence (OSINT)—scraping forums, Telegram channels, and other online sources for deposit addresses.
2. **Transaction tracking**: Once DNM addresses are identified, all Bitcoin transactions to and from these addresses are tracked on the public blockchain.
3. **USD conversion**: Bitcoin values are converted to USD using prices at the time of each transaction.

Limitations: (1) Only tracks Bitcoin, not privacy-focused cryptocurrencies like Monero increasingly used on DNMs; (2) only captures "identified" markets—new or unknown markets may be missed; (3) figures include all flows (deposits, withdrawals, escrow movements), not just completed sales; (4) methodology for initial wallet identification is proprietary and not fully transparent.
Despite these limitations, Chainalysis data provides the best available estimate of aggregate darknet market activity over time.

According to Chainalysis (Chainalysis, 2019):

- Darknet market Bitcoin volumes peaked at approximately $700 million in 2017
- Transaction volumes fell approximately 60% immediately following the AlphaBay/Hansa takedowns
- However, volumes began recovering within months as users migrated to alternative markets (Dream Market, Wall Street Market, Hydra)
- By early 2018—approximately six months post-takedown—transaction volumes had largely recovered, reaching $603 million for the full year

Figure 3 plots estimated darknet market volumes alongside synthetic opioid deaths.



Figure 3: Darknet market Bitcoin transaction volumes (blue, left axis) versus synthetic opioid deaths (red, right axis). Shaded region indicates the post-takedown period. DNM volumes dropped sharply but recovered within approximately six months.

The rapid market recovery has important implications. If darknet users regained access to online drug markets within six months, the window during which they might have been "forced" to street dealers was brief. This weakens the theoretical mechanism linking the takedowns to overdose mortality. Any acute effect would need to have occurred in a narrow window (July 2017–early 2018) and be large enough to detectably shift national mortality trends—an increasingly implausible scenario given the small share of drug users who purchase via darknet markets.

6 Discussion

6.1 Interpretation

Our analysis yields a null finding for the hypothesis that darknet marketplace shutdowns increased overdose deaths. If anything, the opposite pattern emerges: death growth rates decelerated after July 2017. However, we present three independent lines of evidence that this deceleration is not causally attributable to the intervention:

1. **National placebo tests**: Similar deceleration patterns appear at multiple non-intervention dates, suggesting the inflection reflects broader epidemic dynamics.

2. **State-level heterogeneity**: The pattern is not uniform across states ($I^2 = 99\%$).

Eight states show acceleration rather than deceleration, and state-level placebo tests show July 2017 is the most extreme date in only 20% of states.

3. **Rapid market recovery**: Cryptocurrency data shows darknet market activity recovered within six months, meaning the window during which users lacked online alternatives was brief.

The most parsimonious interpretation is that the U.S. opioid epidemic reached an inflection point around 2016–2017, transitioning from rapid acceleration to slower (but still positive) growth. This inflection coincided with—but was likely not caused by—the Operation Bayonet takedowns. The national pattern is largely driven by a few states (Ohio, New York, Maryland) that experienced dramatic trend reversals for reasons that may be unrelated to darknet enforcement.

6.2 Limitations

Several limitations constrain our analysis:

- **Data structure**: The 12-month rolling counts create substantial autocorrelation and smooth over short-term effects. Monthly point-in-time counts would be preferable.
- **Ecological fallacy**: National aggregate data cannot identify individual-level mechanisms. We cannot observe whether darknet users specifically shifted to street dealers.
- **Concurrent factors**: Other policy changes, supply shocks, or secular trends may confound the analysis.
- **Displacement**: Vendors and users may have migrated to other platforms (Dream Market, Wall Street Market) rather than to street markets.

6.3 Policy Implications

Our null finding does not vindicate or condemn darknet enforcement. The marketplace shutdowns may have achieved other objectives (arrests, intelligence gathering, deterrence) without detectably affecting overdose mortality at the national level. The harm-reduction hypothesis remains theoretically plausible but empirically unconfirmed with available data.

Future research could exploit geographic variation in darknet usage (e.g., using cryptocurrency transaction data) to construct difference-in-differences designs with greater identification power.

7 Conclusion

We find no evidence that the 2017 AlphaBay and Hansa takedowns accelerated U.S. drug overdose deaths. The observed post-intervention deceleration in death growth rates reflects a broader epidemic inflection rather than a specific enforcement effect. Three independent analyses support this conclusion:

- National and state-level placebo tests show July 2017 is not a uniquely important date
- State-level analysis reveals massive heterogeneity, with eight states showing acceleration rather than deceleration
- Cryptocurrency data shows darknet markets recovered within six months, limiting the window for any "forced to street dealers" mechanism

The causal impact of darknet marketplace enforcement on public health outcomes remains an open question. Our null finding does not imply that darknet markets provide harm reduction benefits—only that the available evidence cannot detect such effects at the national level. Future research could exploit geographic variation in darknet usage patterns, using cryptocurrency transaction data or postal seizure records, to construct research designs with greater identification power.

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